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OF HUNGRY WOLVES AND 
HORIZONTAL CONFLICTS: 
RETHINKING THE 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BANK 
HOLDING COMPANY LIABILITY 
Eric J. Gauvin* 
To what extent should bank holding companies bear the costs 
of bank failure? Current banking law provides a number of ways 
to impose liability on bank holding companies for bank failure. 
Those devices, however, have developed haphazardly and some­
times rest on inconsistent theoretical foundations. Professor 
Gauvin critiques the regulatory justifications that have been of­
fered for holding company liability and offers an alternative justifi­
cation for imposing liability on holding companies based on the 
idea that directors of bank subsidiaries suffer from an especially 
difficult form of horizontal conflict-the situation where the board 
of directors owes several different duties and chooses to serve 
shareholder interests to the exclusion of all others, including their 
duty to the bank as an entity. He resolves the horizontal conflict 
through the application of agency-like principles. The quasi­
agency approach would treat subsidiary directors as quasi agents 
of the parent company and impose responsibility directly on the 
holding company for any duties that bank managers owe to parties 
other than the bank holding company (including the duty to act in 
the best interest of the bank as an entity). Under the quasi-agency 
approach, the holding company should be liable only to the extent 
that the directors of its properly capitalized bank failed to dis­
charge duties to nonparent constituents (including any duty to the 
bank itself as a separate legal entity). The extent of the liability so 
incurred should be limited to the harm caused by the failure to 
discharge the duty. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The financial services marketplace is in the midst of profound 
change, and the role of bank holding companies within the banking 
industry is changing rapidly as well. Historically, bank holding compa­
nies have been employed as a way to deal with restrictions on branch­
ing or interstate ownership of banks or as a way to circumvent 
restrictions on permissible bank activities.1 Today, those familiar rea­
sons for holding company formation are much less important. Virtu­
ally all states now permit statewide branching,Z so holding companies 
are no longer needed for that purpose. Similarly, federal law now per­
mits nationwide interstate branching, 3 thereby negating the require­
ment that holding companies operating in several states have a bank 
chartered in each state.4 In addition, the Comptroller of the Cur­
rency's authorization of operating subsidiaries for national banks5 
makes the holding company structure less important as a way to get 
around restrictions on bank activities. 6 
Yet even with all these changes, bank holding companies con­
tinue to play a key role in the banking industry and will continue to do 
so for some time to come. Part of the reason for the continuing vitality 
of bank holding companies is that the traditional reasons for forming 
them have not disappeared completely. For example, banking organi­
zations that plan to conduct business in Texas and Montana will need 
the holding company device to conduct operations outside those 
states? Similarly, state-chartered banks not desiring to convert to a 
national charter may need to maintain their holding company struc-
1. See Robert Charles Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. 
L. REv. 787, 816-17, 822-23 (1979) (noting that bank holding companies have been employed as 
a means to achieve branching where states had restrictive branching laws, interstate ownership 
when that was not permitted by law, and entry into businesses "closely related" to banking). 
2. As of the end of 1994, there were no more unit banking states and only two states did 
not permit branching on a statewide basis. See Dean F. Arne!, Trends in the Structure of Federally 
Insured Depository Institutions, 1984-94, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 3 (Jan. 1996). 
3. See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
4. Only Texas and Montana have opted to delay the Riegle-Neal branching provisions. 
Texas has delayed interstate branching until September 1999, and Montana has postponed it 
until October 2001. See Bill McConnell, Interstate Starts Sunday; Impact Will Take Longer, AM. 
BANKER, May 30, 1997, at 2, 2 (noting the decision to delay in Texas and Montana). 
5. The Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated a regulation that permits national 
banks to form operating subsidiaries that may engage in several new activities, such as equip­
ment leasing, insurance, real estate brokerage, real estate development, and securities underwrit­
ing. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,342, 60,349 
(1996) (to be codified as 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 5, 7, 16, 28). Given that most states have parity or "wild 
card" statutes that by law grant their state-chartered institutions powers at least as liberal as the 
powers given to national banks, the extent of liberalized banking powers in the banking system 
as a whole is quite extensive. See CoNFERENCE oF STATE BANK SuPERVISORs, A PROFILE OF 
STATE CHARTERED BANKING 156-58 (1996). 
6. See McConnell, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that some banks plan to convert to a national 
charter, establish operating subsidiaries, and shed their holding company structure). 
7. This is the situation with Chase Manhattan Corp., for example, which owns Texas Com­
merce Bank in Houston. See id. 
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tures to engage in certain activities.8 Other banking organizations may 
decide to keep the holding company structure for the same reasons 
that nonbanking firms choose to organize that way.9 Finally, changes 
in the Federal Reserve's approach to holding company activities may 
make the holding company structure attractive enough to outweigh 
the benefits of converting to a national bank with operating 
subsidiaries.10 
8. For example, First Union Corp. of Charlotte will consolidate 12 of its 13 banks into one 
charter but will keep its separately chartered Delaware bank to take advantage of the insurance 
powers it possesses. See Brett Chase, As Milestone Nears, Banks Prepare to Centralize, AM. 
BANKER, May 15, 1997, at 4, 4. 
9. Norwest, for example, has 41 .charters under its bank holding company structure, but 
other than consolidating the Texas banks under one charter, has no plans for additional consoli­
dation. See id. Similarly, Fifth Third Bancorp of Cincinnati has no plans to merge its 11 bank 
charters into one. See id. Banking organizations may decide to utilize the holding company form 
instead of the consolidated bank with operating divisions approach for reasons unrelated to 
banking regulation. For a traditional view of the rather inconsequential managerial aspects of 
the subsidiary/division distinction in the nonbanking context, see Robert W. Murphy, Corporate 
Divisions vs. Subsidiaries, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1956, at 83, 83 (drawing conclusions as 
to potential advantages one form of organization might provide over the other for managerial 
consideration). On the matter of why firms establish subsidiaries, see CHESTER RoHRLICH, OR­
GANIZING CoRPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES§ 12.02, 508-15 (4th ed. 1967) (citing 
various legal reasons for subsidiary formation such as to limit liability, to avoid restrictions in the 
parent's charter or restrictions arising under law, for tax reasons, and for purposes of avoiding 
complications arising from "foreign corporation" status; also citing nonlegal reasons such as in­
creasing the morale of the subsidiary's management, to settle shareholder disputes, and public 
relations purposes); and compare Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a 
Cause?, 59 FoRDHAM L. REv. 227, 259-73 (1990) (citing use of the subsidiary device as an effec­
tive method for controlling choice of law and venue). 
10. By statute, bank holding companies are allowed to participate in activities "closely re­
lated" to banking provided those activities produce public benefits. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) 
(1994). The Federal Reserve Board has promulgated Regulation Y to specify that "closely re­
lated" activities include such things as acting as an investment advisor to mutual funds, leasing 
property, providing data-processing services, providing courier services, performing real estate 
appraisals, providing investment advice on financial futures and options, and providing tax prep­
aration services. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.125 (1998). Bank holding companies are now permitted, 
among other things, to provide discount brokerage services, see Securities Indus. Ass'n Board of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Schwab), 468 U.S. 207 (1984); Investment Advisor Activi·­
ties, 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(h), and to underwrite (on a limited basis) mortgage-backed securities, 
see Citibank, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 496 (1987), atfd sub nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board 
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 62 (2d Cir. 1988), municipal revenue bonds, 
see Securities Indus. Ass'n, 839 F.2d at 61, and corporate securities, see J.P. Morgan, 75 Fed. Res. 
Bull. 192, 195 (1989). Recently, the Federal Reserve Board has loosened the restrictions between 
banks and their securities affiliates within the holding company structure. See Review of Restric­
tions on Director, Officer, and Employee Interlocks, Cross-Marketing Activities and Purchase 
and Sale of Financial Assets Between a Section 20 Subsidiary and an Affiliated Bank or Thrift, 
61 Fed. Reg. 57,679 passim (1996) (easing or eliminating (1) the prohibition on personnel inter­
locks between a bank and a securities affiliate of a bank holding company; (2) the restrictions on 
joint marketing activities between a bank and a securities affiliate; and (3) the restrictions on the 
purchase and sale of financial assets between a bank and a securities affiliate); and Revenue 
Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Un­
derwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750, 68,751 (1996) (increasing from 10% to 
25% the amount of total revenue that a nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding company may 
derive from underwriting and dealing in securities that the bank is prohibited from dealing in). 
In addition, the Federal Reserve has completely overhauled Regulation Y, the regulation that 
covers bank holding companies, with an eye toward loosening existing restrictions and adding 
new activities to the list of those approved as being "closely related to banking." See generally 
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More significantly, however, bank holding companies will con­
tinue to be an important part of the financial services industry because 
the law says they will. Despite changes in the financial services mar­
ketplace that may affect the relative attractiveness of the traditional 
bank holding company form, the federal banking regulatory scheme 
regulates any organization that controls a "bank"11 as a "bank holding 
company"12 under the Bank Holding Company Act.13 Even if Con­
gress repeals Glass-Steagall, it is likely that the old scheme of regula­
tion as it relates to holding company liability for bank failure will 
continue essentially unchanged.14 Given the continuing application of 
bank holding company regulation, clarification of the legal conse­
quences of bank failure for the parent company ought to be a high 
priority concern for policymakers. 
At present, the extent of holding company liability for bank fail­
ure is a complicated and confusing mess. Over the years, federal bank­
ing regulators have devised a host of legal techniques designed to 
impose liability on bank holding companies in the event of bank fail­
ure.15 In the emerging financial services marketplace these holding 
company obligations could indirectly affect nonbanking affiliates 
within the holding company structure and thereby reduce significantly 
the benefits of the broad changes that are currently sweeping the in-
Melanie L. Fein, Fed's Proposed Overhaul of Regulation Y Goes Far, But Could Be Bolder, 
BANKING PoL'Y REP., Oct. 21, 1996, at 4 (describing the proposed changes to Regulation Y). 
The Fed's initiative seems to be influencing the expansion plans of players in the banking indus­
try. See Mahua Dutta, With Rules Eased, Banks Flock to Securities Underwriting, AM. BANKER, 
Aug. 18, 1997, at 1, 1 (noting the acquisition of securities firms by large banks and the strategic 
changes in regional banks' plans). 
11. As defined by the Bank Holding Company Act, a "bank" is a financial institution 
"which [i] accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by check or 
similar means for payment to third parties or others on demand; and [ii] is engaged in the busi­
ness of making commercial loans." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)(B). 
12. As defined by statute, a bank holding company is any company that has control over a 
bank or over a company that has control of .a bank. See § 1841(a)(l). Typically, although not 
always, bank holding companies are corporations. But see§ 1841(b) (defining bank holding com­
pany to mean any "corporation, partnership, business trust, association, or similar 
organization"). 
13. See §§ 1841-1850. 
14. For example, none of the banking law proposals presented to the 105th Congress called 
for the wholesale repeal of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), although all would have 
changed the terminology of the BHCA to refer to "Financial Services Holding Companies" in­
stead of bank holding companies. See Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997, H.R. 10, 
105th Cong. §§ 128, 129 (1997), Depository Institution Affiliation and Thrift Charter Conversion 
Act, H.R. 268, 105th Cong. Title II (1997), and Depository Institution Affiliation Act, H.R. 669 
& S. 298, 105th Cong. § 102 (1997). 
15. These regulatory mechanisms include, among other things, the so-called source of 
strength doctrine, see 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1998), cross-guarantee provisions, see 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1815(e) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998), capital restoration plans, see 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii), 
regulatory agreements, the elaboration of a general fiduciary duty to regulators, equitable subor­
dination, preferences, and fraudulent conveyances. See Eric J. Gouvin, Shareholder Enforced 
Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, 16 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 311, 333-45 (1997) 
(describing the various regulatory methods in light of a pervasive scheme to impose liability on 
holding companies). 
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dustry. The significance of this potential liability is even greater when 
one takes into account the possibility that nonfinancial commercial 
firms may eventually be permitted to own banks.16 
The liability-imposing devices available to the banking regulators, 
therefore, make a difference in how attractive bank ownership will be. 
A broad ranging liability regime that puts all of the holding company's 
assets at stake in the event of bank failure will increase the cost of 
owning a bank relative to other financial intermediaries and therefore 
make bank ownership less attractive. On the other hand, a regime that 
limits the holding company's liability to the amount invested in the 
bank will make bank ownership relatively more attractive but could 
result in some costs of bank failure being shifted away from the share­
holders onto other parties. Before looking at potential solutions to 
this problem, this article examines the devices currently available to 
regulators for shifting the cost of bank failure. 
The most powerful tool currently available to banking regulators 
for indirectly shifting the costs of bank failure to holding companies is 
the cross-guarantee device created by the Financial Institutions Re­
form, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)P The cross 
guarantee provisions allow the receiver of a failed bank to make 
claims against the sister banks of the failed institution for the loss that 
the receiver incurs or anticipates that it will incur in disposing of or. 
assisting the failed institution.18 Although the cross guarantee is a 
powerful tool, with interstate branching now in effect, fewer and fewer 
holding companies will own more than one bank subsidiary,19 thereby 
16. This position has been advocated seriously in the current round of proposed banking 
reform legislation. See Bill McConnell, Capital Briefs: Treasury Hears Case for Broader Bank 
Ownership, AM. BANKER, Feb. 4, 1997, at 2, 2. To some extent, the existence of so-called unitary 
thrifts has already permitted commercial firms like General Electric and General Motors to 
operate huge financial businesses within their existing corporate structures. See Steve Cocheo, 
Special Briefing: The Banking-Commerce Debate, A.B.A. BANKING J., July 1997, at 7, 8 (giving 
an overview of the history and current ·status of the intermingling of banking and commerce). In 
light of the fact that Congress has been discussing seriously the idea of eliminating the thrift 
charter and converting all thrifts into bank charters, a number of financial services providers are 
rushing to obtain thrift charters in the hope that they will be grandfathered if and when the 
conversion occurs. See Stephen E. Frank, Brokers Insurers Queue Up for Thrift Charters, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 24, 1997, at Cl. This tactic seems to be especially popular with insurers that desire to 
enter the banking business. See Steve Cocheo, What's at Stake with Unitary Thrifts, A.B.A. 
BANKING J., Oct. 1997, at 74, 74 (noting that State Farm Insurance Co., Travelers Group, Princi­
pal Financial Group, and TransAmerica Corp. have all sought thrift charters). On a limited basis, 
the state of Utah has already permitted this crossover by allowing nonfinancial firms to acquire 
Utah industrial banks, which offer deposits insured by the FDIC. See Bill McConnell, Utah to 
End Freeze on Charters for Industrial Loan Companies, AM. BANKER, Apr. 3, 1997, at 3, 3. 
17. See Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U .S.C. 
and 27 U.S.C.). The cross-guarantee provisions are codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1815(e) (West 1989 
& Supp. 1998). 
18. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1815(e). 
19. Many large banking firms have decided to consolidate all of their bank charters into 
one institution, thereby in essence becoming single bank holding companies, or alternatively, 
shedding the holding company structure altogether to operate as a bank with subsidiaries. See 
Chase, supra note 8, at 4. For example, Minneapolis-based First Bank System, Inc., will combine 
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rendering the cross-guarantee provisions less effective as a means of 
shifting the costs of resolving a failed bank. If the cross-guarantee de­
vice becomes ineffectual by the implementation of the interstate 
banking law, bank regulators will in all likelihood look for other ways 
to protect the deposit insurance fund. The Federal Reserve Board's 
"source of strength" doctrine may have a new day in the sun. 
Under the source of strength doctrine, bank holding companies 
are required to assist bank subsidiaries in difficult financial times by 
providing financial assistance to them.20 Although the validity of the 
source of strength is an open question,Z1 the Federal Reserve Board 
continues to employ the source of strength idea in its decisions.22 A 
return to the source of strength doctrine could mean that bank hold­
ing companies and, indirectly, their affiliates will essentially become 
unlimitedly liable for the losses that may occur when an insured bank 
fails. 
The current regulatory scheme goes too far in imposing liability 
on bank holding companies for bank failure, resulting in negative con­
sequences. 23 I believe the move toward increased liability for bank 
holding companies is misplaced and should be reassessed to give more 
respect to the separate legal existence of well-capitalized banks and 
the holding companies that own them. My conclusions stem from the 
realization that the trend toward increased holding company liability 
has not been informed by a consistent and coherent theory. Although 
federal banking regulation embraces the notion that a holding com­
pany should in some circumstances be liable for the failure of its bank­
ing subsidiary, the regulatory scheme does not justify that outcome 
with a rigorous policy rationale capable of providing guidance on the 
questions of when such liability is appropriate or what the appropriate 
extent of the liability should be. 
Several commentators have offered proposals for rethinking the 
current scheme of bank holding company liability. Professor Howell 
Jackson has undertaken the most exhaustive analysis and has con­
cluded that the myriad regulatory devices presently available should 
be scrapped and replaced by a scheme of enhanced holding company 
obligations that would apply to all financial holding companies (not 
most of its nine banks into one charter. See id. KeyCorp, headquartered in Cleveland, will merge 
its 12 bank subsidiaries into one. See id. Other banks taking advantage of consolidation include 
Wells Fargo & Co., BankAmerica Corp., and First Union Corp. of Charlotte. See id. 
20. See Policy Statement; Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of 
Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707, 15,707 (1987). 
21. For a brief discussion of the evolution of the source of strength doctrine and its current 
status, see Leonard Bierman & Donald R. Fraser, The "Source of Strength" Doctrine: Formulat­
ing the Future of America's Financial Markets, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 269, 269 (1993); 
Gouvin, supra note 15, at 333-36. 
22. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 133, 137 (1993); Bane One Corp., 78 
Fed. Res. Bull. 159, 161 (1992). 
23. See Gouvin, supra note 15, at 345-54. 
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just bank holding companies) and would be limited to some ascertain­
able amount, such as five percent of the subsidiary's liabilities or ex­
isting capital requirements.24 Professor Jackson's proposals can be 
justified by one of the traditional policy rationales for holding com­
pany liability-the beliefthat the present regulatory scheme has dete­
riorated to the point where there must be more incentive on the part 
of the equityholders in the bank to pay close attention to the level of 
risk being undertaken by bank managers.25 I call that justification the 
"market discipline hypothesis." I have argued elsewhere that the mar­
ket discipline justification for holding company liability is ineffectual 
after a certain point,26 and this article argues that Professor Jackson's 
approach, resting as it does on a faulty justification, falls short of the 
mark.27 
Professor Jackson is the only writer on the topic of holding com­
pany obligations who has taken seriously the task of providing a legiti­
mate and rigorous justification for the policy. Others who have written 
on the topic of holding company liability justify their positions implic­
itly and without careful scrutiny of the regulatory aims to be achieved. 
For example, Professor Cassandra Jones Havard has advanced a pro­
posal that would permit regulators to combine banking affiliates in a 
holding company family into one large bank to satisfy the obligations 
of a failed banking unit.28 She does not address the larger question of 
why the law should not respect the bank as a legal entity. Similarly, 
Professor Lissa Lamkin Broome has proposed an essentially open­
ended enterprise liability approach to holding company liability.29 She 
does not address the question of why the liability should extend be­
yond the bank itself either. Finally, Professors Jonathan Macey and 
Geoffrey Miller have suggested that the banking system would do well 
to return to the idea of double liability for shareholders of failed 
banks.30 Their approach, like Professor Jackson's, is based on the mar­
ket discipline idea, but they do not address the concerns raised by this 
24. See Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 509, 616 (1994). 
25. See id. at 513. 
26. See Gouvin, supra note 15, at 311. 
27. See infra notes 283-96 and accompanying text. 
28. See Cassandra Jones Havard, Back to the Parent: Holding Company Liability for Sub­
sidiary Banks-A Discussion of the Net Worth Maintenance Agreement, the Source of Strength 
Doctrine, and the Prompt Corrective Action Provision, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 2353, 2358 (1995) 
(criticizing the source of strength doctrine, regulatory agreements, and the prompt corrective 
action provisions and suggesting the use of substantive consolidation of bank subsidiaries to 
shore up a failing bank). 
29. See Lissa L. Broome, Redistributing Bank Insolvency Risks: Challenges to Limited Lia­
bility in the Bank Holding Company Structure, 26 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 935, 967-1004 (1993) 
(reviewing the range of enhanced holding company obligations and concluding that the regula­
tory scheme would work better if the liability of holding companies were more open ended). 
30. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: 
History and Implications, 27 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 31, 33 (1992) (describing the benefits of a 
double liability system). 
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article about the appropriateness of that purported justification for 
bank holding company obligations. 
This article remedies the shortcomings of previous approaches to 
the subject by developing a defensible theory of when it may be ap­
propriate to impose liability on bank holding companies when a bank 
subsidiary fails. It articulates a new justification for imposing liability 
on bank holding companies based on the idea that the central issue in 
banking regulation is the tendency of bank managers to do the bid­
ding of shareholders to the exclusion of other constituencies to whom 
they may owe a duty, such as depositors, the deposit insurance fund, 
or even the bank itself as a legal entity.31 It argues that the most expe­
ditious way to resolve the conflict between bank shareholders and 
other bank claimants in the holding company structure is through the 
application of agency-like principles.32 In short, the quasi-agency ap­
proach resolves the conflict problem of subsidiary bank managers by 
recognizing that the directors of subsidiaries are in some sense the 
agents of the parent-shareholder. As such, the law should recognize 
that the directors owe a strong duty to the parent and that the parent 
duty is likely to override any other duty that the directors may theo­
retically owe to nonshareholders. In the quasi-agency approach sug­
gested here, the subsidiary directors would be relieved of this conflict 
by impressing on them a duty to act solely in the shareholder's best 
interests and then imposing directly on the holding company the re­
sponsibility for any duties that the bank subsidiary's directors may 
owe to nonshareholders. The transfer of these duties can be justified 
on the theory that the bank directors are essentially agents for the 
corporate parent. Under the quasi-agency approach, the holding com­
pany should be liable only to the extent that the directors of its prop­
erly capitalized bank failed to discharge duties to nonshareholder 
constituents (including any duty to the bank itself as a separate legal 
entity), and the extent of the liability so incurred should be limited to 
the harm caused by the failure to discharge the duty. 
By imposing the duties to nonshareholder constituencies directly 
on the holding company the quasi-agency approach frees the bank di­
rectors from an otherwise untenable situation where traditional cor­
porate law would charge them with a duty to the corporation 
generally and the shareholders specifically, but in which their alle­
giance almost assuredly would be solely with the shareholder's inter­
ests?3 At the same time, the quasi-agency approach gives appropriate 
31. This dilemma is what Professor Lawrence Mitchell calls a "horizontal conflict." See 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constitu­
ency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REv. 579, 603-07 (1992) (describing the idea of horizontal conflicts). 
32. This is an extension of an idea first developed in the subsidiary director context. For a 
more complete description, see Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 287 passim (1996) (developing the idea of horizontal conflicts from the point of 
view of directors of subsidiaries). 
33. See id. at 302-07; Mitchell, supra note 31, at 605-07. 
  
No.3] HUNGRY WOLVES 957 
respect to the legal entities involved and limits holding company lia­
bility to matters where a constituent's interests were not addressed 
properly because of the hovering presence of the parent holding 
company. 
Part II of the article examines the policy justifications that have 
been offered in the past for imposing the costs of bank failure on hold­
ing companies.34 Those justifications include (1) the idea that banks 
are "special" and must be protected from failure with extraordinary 
provisions to safeguard the banking system;35 (2) the "cost defraying" 
hypothesis whereby enhanced holding company obligations are in 
some sense a recompense for the generous subsidy provided by bank­
ing regulation;36 (3) the "hungry wolf" hypothesis, which casts the 
holding company as exploiter of its subsidiaries and uses enhanced 
obligations to even the balance;37 ( 4) the market discipline hypothesis, 
which posits that the holding company must have sufficient incentives 
to monitor the risk taking of bank management;38 (5) the enterprise 
liability rationale, which seeks to impose costs on the holding com­
pany on the theory that the parent and subsidiary corporations are in 
fact one economic unit;39 and (6) the political explanation, which sees 
holding company obligations as nothing but wealth transfers from one 
rent-seeking group to another.40 After close examination, part II con­
cludes that none of these justifications provides a compelling reason 
for imposing broad liability on bank holding companies. 
Part III proceeds to rethink the policy justification for imposing 
liability on bank holding companies by examining the outside limits of 
such liability.41 It then develops an alternative justification for impos­
ing some costs of bank failure on the bank holding company based on 
the quasi-agency idea discussed above. Part IV examines proposals 
made by other commentators regarding the appropriate limits of en­
hanced holding company obligations.42 Because these approaches rely 
on the traditional regulatory justifications for holding company liabil­
ity, however, part IV finds these approaches unsatisfactory. Part V 
concludes that the horizontal conflict justification is the most defensi­
ble policy rationale for enhanced holding company obligations, and 
that the quasi-agency approach to holding company liability is the 
most appropriate method of calibrating the amount of liability im­
posed on the holding company.43 
34. See infra notes 44-145 and accompanying text. 
35. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text. 
36. See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text. 
37. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text. 
38. See infra notes 91-115 and accompanying text. 
39. See infra notes 116-29 and accompanying text. 
40. See infra notes 130-45 and accompanying text. 
41. See infra notes 146-281 and accompanying text. 
42. See infra notes 282-334 and accompanying text. 
43. See infra Part V. 
 
958 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 
II. JusTIFICATIONS FOR HEIGHTENED HoLDING 
COMPANY LIABILITY 
[Vol. 1999 
A significant problem in addressing the balance of liability be­
tween bank holding companies and their bank subsidiaries is that the 
current regulatory scheme seems to have evolved without the benefit 
of a guiding theoretical justification. One may examine the existing 
methods of imposing liability on bank holding companies and deduce 
from them a theory, but the theory is derivative, not organic. The lack 
of a guiding principle is hardly surprising because the regulatory re­
sponse has displayed a classic "incrementalist" development-driven 
more by a pragmatic imperative to "muddle through" the crisis in 
front of it than to establish a theoretically coherent and consistent ap­
proach to the problem.44 Rather than being guided by a grand plan 
that envisions a particular goal for the banking industry and provides 
a regulatory scheme calculated to bring it closer to that goal, the pres­
ent approach to holding company liability instead appears almost en­
tirely remedial and reactive. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why there is no grand plan for bank 
holding company liability is that there has been no thorough articula­
tion of what regulatory goals are advanced through the imposition of 
that liability. Under ordinary principles of corporate jurisprudence, 
separate legal entities, even parent and subsidiary, should ordinarily 
be respected. The disregard of corporate entities requires a compel­
ling justification.45 Although the banking regulatory scheme does not 
need to rest on a rationale sufficient to justify "piercing the corporate 
veil," it ought to nevertheless rest on a rigorous policy rationale. The 
lack of a theoretical approach to holding company liability makes the 
exercise of determining what holding company liabilities should be 
quite difficult. 
Banking policy needs to be informed by a sophisticated theory so 
that policymakers can construct a model of how the world works and 
make educated decisions about how a particular change in public pol­
icy might affect the behavior that they are trying to regulate.46 A so-
44. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", 19 Pua. ADMIN. REv. 
79, 80 (1959). 
45. Generally courts will disregard the corporate entity only in "rare particular situations 
to prevent gross inequity." Evans v. Multicon Constr. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 395,398 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1991). In general, the injustice or unfairness complained of must amount to something more than 
merely stating that the corporation owes the plaintiff money. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper 
Source, 941 F.2d 519, 522-23 (7th Cir. 1991). 
46. The importance of a sophisticated model in the legislative problem-solving methodol­
ogy is discussed at length in Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative Meth­
odology, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1281, 1334-38 (1994) (describing how the failure to construct a 
sophisticated model of the consumer financial services market has contributed to the adoption of 
ineffectual legislation); see also Robert B. Seidman, Justifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institu­
tionalist Approach to the Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory, and Practical Reason, 29 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 32 (1992) (discussing the philosophical beliefs to which legislative drafters 
must subscribe in order to be effective). 
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phisticated theory allows regulators to cease merely muddling through 
and instead to make plans based on a comprehensive, rational model 
of regu,lation.47 A sophisticated theory also helps policymakers deter­
mine if they were successful in meeting the problem that confronted 
them and whether modifications to the regulatory approach are 
needed to fine tune the legislative-regulatory response.48 Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, a theory is needed because in the govern­
ment's system of checks and balances, acts of the regulatory and legis­
lative arms of government must be justified in acceptable public policy 
terms.49 Actions of regulators and legislators that cannot be so justi­
fied are considered illegitimate.50 
In trying to make sense of the regulatory hodgepodge that consti­
tutes enhanced bank holding company liabilities, several possible jus­
tifications have been advanced, including the idea that banks are 
special; that holding company obligations are a means to replenish the 
deposit funds; that the obligations are needed to prevent holding com­
panies from exploiting their bank subsidiaries; that the obligations 
create incentives for holding companies to monitor bank management 
more closely; that the bank and the bank holding company constitute 
one economic enterprise and therefore should be treated as such 
under the law; and, finally, that such regulation can be explained only 
in political terms. Each of these justifications is discussed below. In my 
view, none of these offered justifications are compelling enough to 
warrant the extensive holding company liability the law has imposed. 
A. Specialness 
One way to view the increased obligations of bank holding com­
panies is as a reaction to the idea that banks are in some way "special" 
so that they should not be allowed to fail.51 The proponents52 of the 
47. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 
393 passim (1981) (discussing the comprehensive rationality approach to regulation and con­
trasting it with the incrementalist approach). 
48. To the extent postenactment review of statutes is part of our regulatory landscape, the 
reviewing body needs some standard against which to measure the statute's effectiveness. See 
generally Gouvin, supra note 46, at 1364-70 (providing a general overview of common postenact­
ment review devices). 
49. See id. at 1324-25 (noting that legislative enactments must be justified in terms the 
public will accept as being for the common good). 
50. · See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 78 
(1985) ("Requiring justifications does not, to be sure, guarantee 'reasoned analysis' on the part 
of the legislature. . . . But requiring justifications does provide an important prophylactic 
function."). 
51. Probably the clearest expression of the idea·that banks are "special" is the so-called too 
big to fail doctrine. Under that policy, the federal deposit insurance funds made whole all of the 
depositors of key banks, regardless of whether they were fully covered by deposit insurance, on 
the theory that to allow the affeCted bank to fail would have caused major systemic disruption. 
The too big to fail doctrine may have been eradicated by a provision in the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (1994), which seeks to limit the 
insurance protection of large depositors. But proclaiming the demise of the problem may be 
premature. While § 1823( c)( 4) ostensibly eliminates the too big to fail doctrine by strengthening 
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specialness position have argued that banks are unique players in the 
economy and deserve special treatment under the law because they 
possess three key characteristics: (1) they offer transaction accounts; 
(2) they serve as a backup source of liquidity for other financial insti­
tutions; and (3) they serve as the transmission belt for monetary pol­
icy. 53 The idea of specialness has been attacked on the grounds that 
the purportedly "special" characteristics are no longer unique to 
banks; therefore, there is nothing special about banks providing these 
services. 54 
Another basis for the purported specialness of banks is the obser­
vation that the major source of funding for banks comes from the gen­
eral public and that the depositors need to be protected from bank 
insolvency.55 Perhaps in the days when banks were the primary recipi­
ents of household financial assets this rationale may have held some 
validity, but today there are many other options for the investment of 
excess household assets, and banks no longer hold the dominant posi-
the requirement of "least cost resolution" on the FDIC's actions, it should be noted that 
§ 1823(c)(4) coexists with the statutory authority of the FDIC to make payments in excess of the 
insurance coverage amounts if necessary to protect the local economy where the bank failure 
occurred. See§ 1823(c)(4)(G) (1994). How these two provisions will work together in the future 
remains to be seen. 
52. The specialness argument was most clearly articulated by Paul Volcker and Gerald Cor­
rigan in the early to mid 1980s. See Statement Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer 
and Monetary Affairs of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representa­
tives, June 11, 1986, reprinted in 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 541, 542-44 (1986); Paul A. Volcker, State­
ment Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Sept. 13, 
1983, reprinted in 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 757, 758-59 (1983); E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS 1982 ANNUAL REPORT (1982), in JONATHAN R. 
MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAw AND REGULATION 75, 76-79 (2d ed. 1997). For 
a general discussion and critique of the specialness of banks, see Anthony Saunders, Bank Hold­
ing Companies: Structure, Performance and Reform, in REsTRUCTURING BANKING AND FINAN­
CIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 156, 157-63 (WilliamS. Haraf & Rose Marie Kushmeider eds., 1988) 
(hereinafter RESTRUCTURING]. 
53. See Corrigan, supra note 52, at 76. 
54. See Richard C. Aspinwall, On the "Specialness" of Banking, IssuEs BANK REG., Au­
tumn 1983, at 16, 17. For example, many nonbanks provide transaction accounts which are essen­
tially identical to traditional bank checking accounts. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REv. 237, 237 
(1992); David M. Eaton, Comment, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of lnvestmelu 
Banks and Other Nonbanks, 44 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1200-14 (1995). Similarly, banks are no longer 
the only mechanism for providing liquidity, as technology has made it possible for borrowers to 
access the credits markets without using banks as intermediaries. See Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the 
Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 9 (1995). Finally, banks' 
role in the implementation of monetary policy is clearly not as important as it may have once 
seemed. The Federal Reserve carries out its monetary policy goals primarily through the mecha­
nism of open market operations. These purchases and sales of government securities are exe­
cuted with the cooperation of many players-not just banks, but securities dealers and investors. 
See Aspinwall, supra at 19, 20. 
55. See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 
11 (1976); see also Clark, supra note 1, at 814-15 (1979) ("The major reason for the enormous 
amount of special regulation of financial intermediaries, as opposed to nonfinancial business 
corporations, is to insure their soundness, in order that their public suppliers of capital may be 
protected against the risk of the intermediaries' financial failure."). 
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tion.56 Given changes in the financial services marketplace, it is hard 
to make a special case for preventing bank failure as a way to protect 
the unsophisticated general public unless that rationale also extends to 
the companies that control mutual funds, securities brokers, and insur­
ance companies. Concern for the "little guy" seems even more out of 
place as a rationale for preventing bank failure in light of the fact that 
deposit insurance protects the vast majority of depositors. In the end, 
although some stalwart supporters of specialness remain, the special­
ness debate is largely over, and the opponents of specialness won.57 
Because the Federal Reserve System was the home of special­
ness's strongest supporters, and because the Federal Reserve regu­
lates bank holding companies, the legacy of specialness lives on. The 
biggest concern flowing from the idea of specialness was the fear that 
bank failures could degenerate into banking panics that could topple 
the entire banking system.58 In bank runs, some depositors seek to 
withdraw their funds not because they have a need for liquidity but 
rather because they fear that the bank will become insolvent and that 
they will lose their deposit altogether.59 By making the bank holding 
company serve as a "source of strength," or through other regulatory 
devices for extracting financial resources from holding companies, the 
reasoning goes, the law may create an impression of stability in the 
bank that may counteract the loss of public confidence in a banking 
crisis. In this way, enhanced holding company obligations may be seen 
as a strategy to deter bank failure to prevent potentially catastrophic 
bank runs. By imposing the costs of bank failure on holding compa­
nies, the regulatory scheme creates great incentives for the holding 
companies to keep their banking affiliates afloat or to sell the opera­
tion instead of letting the bank go out of business the way a nonbank­
ing commercial firm would. Under this justification for holding 
company obligations, the costs of bank failure should be shifted to the 
holding company to the maximum extent possible to prevent bank 
failure, with the goal of eliminating bank failure, if possible. 
56. Other industries competing for household funds include the mutual fund, securities, 
pension, and insurance industries. Over the past 20 years, banks' share of U.S. financial assets 
has fallen from 66% to less than 30%. See WilliamS. Haraf, Emerging Issues in Financial Mar­
kets, REGULATION, Winter 1994, at 12. Some have suggested that banks as they currently exist 
are actually obsolete. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failure: The Politiciza­
tion of a Social Problem, 45 STAN. L. REv. 289, 290 (1992) ("U.S. banks ... offer an antiquated, 
obsolete package of goods and services to consumers who have an ever-increasing array of supe­
rior, low-cost substitutes from which to choose."). 
57. See Edward E. Furash, Banks Are Obsolete-And Who Cares, 1 N.C. BANKING lNST. 1 
(1997) (articulating comments from industry participant who clearly thought that banks once 
were special but now conceding defeat with a bit of longing for the good old days). 
58. See Anna J. Schwartz, Financial Stability and the Federal Safety Net, in RESTRUCTIJR. 
lNG, supra note 52, at 34, 39 ("The main reason for concern about widespread bank failures is 
that they may degenerate into banking panics that produce a drastic decline of the money stock 
with disastrous effects on economic activity."). 
59. See Saunders, supra note 52, at 158 (explaining the dynamics of a bank run). 
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On closer examination of the available evidence, however, the 
fear of a bank failure expanding into the potential failure of the entire 
banking system appears unjustified.60 Such a catastrophic domino ef­
fect is in reality a very rare event.61 It is much more likely that a bank 
run would result in the redepositing of funds from weak banks into 
strong banks.62 Therefore, if the specialness of banks is the justifica­
tion for increased bank holding company liability, that justification is 
subject to a strong empirical challenge and, thus, does not provide a 
solid footing for the regulatory scheme. Conversely, if banks are not 
special, there needs to be some explanation for why the scheme of 
parent liability in the banking industry departs from the traditional 
scheme of respecting separate legal entities. 
B. The Cost-Defraying Hypothesis 
One way to explain why the banking regulators have developed 
extensive holding company liability rules is what Professor Howell 
Jackson has called the "cost-defraying hypothesis"63 or, to put it more 
colloquially, the "deep pocket" theory. In short, the deposit insurance 
funds are not inexhaustible, and the regulatory scheme has developed 
ways to recapitalize those depleted funds from sources other than the 
taxpaying public.64 Such a justification could be grounded on the rea­
soning that because holding companies benefit from the deposit insur­
ance that covers their banking subsidiaries, they should pay the price 
as well. A quote from the Senate report on FIRREA's cross-guaran­
tee provisions illustrates the cost-defraying idea quite clearly: "A par­
ent company that has benefitted from Federal Deposit Insurance 
protections of its depository institution subsidiary should absorb 
losses incurred by that institution before they are passed on to the 
taxpayer. "65 
60. See id. at 162 ("One problem [with the specialness idea] has been the tendency to exag­
gerate the social costs of bank failures by loosely extrapolating the effects of an individual bank 
failure into a potential failure of the whole system."); Daniel R. Fischel et a!., The Regulation of 
Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301, 310-11 (1987) (discussing, and dis­
missing, the idea that bank failures are contagious). The economic models that predict dire con­
sequences from bank failure are too oversimplified to justify larger systemic policy decisions. See 
Saunders, supra note 52, at 158. 
61. See Schwartz, supra note 58, at 39-40, 55-56 n.1 (noting that prior to 1930, banking 
panics were uncommon and providing empirical evidence to support her conclusion). 
62. See Saunders, supra note 52, at 159 (citing a study that concluded that most runs on 
individual banks would result in redepositing to sound banks). 
63. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 559 (describing the cost-defraying explanation). 
64. See id. But see Alfred J.T. Byrne & Judith Bailey, FDIC Addresses Three D&O Lawsuit 
Issues, A.B.A. BANKING J., Oct. 1992, at 47, 48 (stating that the FDIC officially denies that it 
sues all deep pockets). 
65. See S. REP. No. 102-167, at 60 (1991). 
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An underlying premise to this position is the idea that banks re­
ceive a subsidy from the federal government.66 In the words of Fed­
eral Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
In this century the Congress has delegated the use of sover­
eign credit-the power to create money and borrow unlimited 
funds at the lowest possible rate-to support the banking system. 
It has done so indirectly as a consequence of deposit insurance, 
Federal Reserve discount window access, and final riskless settle­
ment of payment system transactions .... 
. . . [As a result of the government's major role in protecting 
the banking system, banks get an unfair advantage over other fi­
nancial services providers because banks] determine the level of 
risk-taking and receive the gains therefrom but do not bear the 
full costs of that risk. The remainder of the risk is transferred to 
the government.67 
Although Greenspan sees the creation of a subsidy to banking as an 
"undesirable but unavoidable consequence of creating a safety net,"68 
he believes that the subsidy should be contained within the bank to 
the extent possible to prevent the transfer of the sovereign credit sub­
sidy for nonbanking purposes, which might result in a "subsidized 
competitive advantage" to the bank affiliate.69 Imposing liabilities on 
holding companies when subsidized banks fail could be justified as a 
way for the government to recoup part of the subsidy that the holding 
company supposedly profited from during the operation of the bank. 
If this is the basis for holding company liability, one would think that 
the fair limit of liability should be the value of the subsidy received, 
although this idea has never been seriously proposed. 
While the cost-defraying justification clearly has an attractive 
political aspecC0 and is anchored in the intuitively simple connection 
to covering the costs of the insurance fund, it is subject to criticism on 
at least three grounds. First, the existence of a "subsidy" from the fed­
eral government to the banking system is by no means a universally 
66. See David G. Oedel, Puzzling Banking Law: Its Effects and Purposes, 67 U. CoLO. L. 
REv. 477, 479 (1996) ("[B]anking law enshrines fundamental economic inefficiencies in banking 
that are tolerable for banks because of breathtaking anticompetitive protections and financial 
subsidies-protections and subsidies that are not always apparent to outsiders nor admitted pub­
licly by banking savants."). 
67. Statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Com­
mittee on Banking and Fmancial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Feb. 13, 1997, re­
printed in 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 249, 249-50 (1997). 
68. See id. at 250. 
69. See id. 
70. See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DuKE L.J. 469, 
520-29 (1992) (describing a link between the health of the deposit insurance fund and political 
pressure for cost-defraying rules). 
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accepted notion.71 Other regulators have pointed out that while de­
posit insurance may bestow a subsidy of approximately four to seven 
basis points, that benefit is more than outweighed by the regulatory 
costs of obtaining deposit insurance, maintaining capital reserves, un­
dergoing examinations, and complying with safety and soundness 
regulations. 72 
Second, if the imposition of liability is a payback for the benefits 
bestowed by deposit insurance, clearly the holding company is not the 
only market participant that should be potentially liable. Other bene­
ficiaries of the deposit insurance scheme include borrowers, deposi­
tors, and bank employees, yet they are not targeted for additional 
liability after an insured institution fails.73 
Third, the idea that after the fact liability is recompense for the 
benefit of deposit insurance neatly glosses over the fact that the in­
sured institutions have already paid for the insurance coverage.74 Pro­
ponents of the cost-defraying hypothesis do not offer a convincing 
argument for treating deposit insurance differently from other kinds 
of insurance. Some commentators have noted that federal deposit in­
surance is meaningfully different from private insurance contracts be­
cause private insurers are free to use such contractual devices as 
deductibles, coinsurance, and risk-related premiums, while the federal 
deposit insurers traditionally have not been able to avail themselves of 
those techniques.75 
This argument is no longer true. The FDIC now has many of the 
same contractual tools at its disposal that private insurers have?6 For 
example, the deposit insurance program has always used the tech­
nique of policy limits, by limiting the coverage for deposit insurance to 
71. See Statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Subcom­
mittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Banking and Finan­
cial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Feb. 13, 1997 (visited Aug. 31, 1997) <http:// 
www.house.gov/banking/21397occ.htm> (refuting the subsidy hypothesis); Testimony of Ricki 
Helfer, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Before the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee on Banking and 
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Mar. 5, 1997 (visited Aug. 31, 1997) <http:// 
www.fdic.gov/publish/speeches/97spchs/sp05mar.htmi> (concluding, after rebutting the points 
made by Chairman Greenspan, "[I]f banks receive a net subsidy from the federal safety net, it is 
small."). 
72. See Statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, supra note 71; Testimony of Ricki Helfer, supra 
note 71 (noting that the FDIC estimates the cost to banks of the federal safety net subsidy 
received at 33 basis points). 
73. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 561, n.192. 
74. See Testimony of Ricki Helfer, supra note 71 (noting that the banking industry, not the 
government, pays the premiums that fund the deposit insurance program, and that recourse to 
the full faith and credit of the federal government would only apply in the event the deposit 
insurance fund fails-which it has never done on the banking industry side). 
75. See Fischel et a!., supra note 60, at 314-15. 
76. For a general discussion of the pros and cons of this idea, see James R. Barth et a!., 
Reforming Federal Deposit Insurance: What Can Be Learned from Private Insurance Practices?, 
45 CoNsUMER FIN. L.Q. 140 passim (1991). 
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accounts held in a particular right or capacity to $100,000.77 Although 
Congress has not used control of policy limits as aggressively as possi­
ble in controlling deposit insurance costs,78 it has used the policy limit 
rationale to tighten some regulations to lower the likelihood that one 
customer could have several insured accounts. More recently, the 
FDIC has enacted risk-based deposit insurance premiums.79 Under 
the current regime, a bank's deposit insurance premiums are now 
linked to the bank's exposure to interest rate-risk, credit risk, insider 
abuse, operating risk, and diversification risk.80 Similarly, the capital 
requirements that banks must comply with serve a function similar to 
the role played by the deductibles in the private sector. Even more 
explicitly, Congress has experimented with some privatization tech­
niques by authorizing the FDIC to engage in reinsurance of the de­
posit insurance risk.81 
These techniques taken together, along with the extensive regula­
tory powers that the FDIC exercises over its insured institutions (far 
more extensive and invasive than any comparable oversight by private 
insurance providers), should put the FDIC in a position to run the 
deposit insurance fund like a private insurance company. Viewed in 
this light, deposit insurance should be treated like other kinds of in­
surance, and the relative rights of the insured and the insurer should 
be informed accordingly.82 The cost-defraying rationale does not offer 
a credible explanation for why deposit insurance should operate 
differently. 
77. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m) (1994); see also Deposit Insurance Coverage, 12 C.F.R. § 330.3 
(1998). The FDIC may have compromised the value of this mechanism by imprudent invocation 
of the "too big to fail" doctrine whereby all depositors, insured and uninsured, were promised 
full return of their funds, but nevertheless, the technique is available and used by the FDIC. 
Critics could point out that the deposit limits are relatively easy to circumvent, see Gouvin, supra 
note 15, at 321-22, but that does not change the fact that the technique, though imperfect, is 
nevertheless available to the FDIC in managing the deposit insurance risk. 
78. For example, the report from the Treasury Department on modernizing the banking 
system had suggested reducing the policy limits to $100,000 per customer per bank so that a 
given individual would not be able to "double dip" by holding accounts in several rights and 
capacities at the same institution. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS 19 (1991). This recom­
mendation was not adopted by Congress in subsequent banking legislation. 
79. See§ 1817(b)(1)(A). 
80. See James Chessen, How FDIC's Risk-Based Insurance Premiums Work, A.B.A. BANK­
ERS WKLY., Oct. 6, 1992, at 8. 
81. See§ 1817(b)(1)(B). For an excellent discussion of the many issues raised by the possi­
ble use of the reinsurance market to help spread the risks of deposit insurance, see Anna Kuzmik 
Walker, Harnessing the Free Market: Reinsurance Models for FDIC Deposit Insurance Pricing, 18 
HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 735, 752-75 (1995). 
82. By analogy, it would be outrageous for a homeowner who is covered by fire insurance 
to be held personally liable for the damage done to an insured dwelling that burns to the ground 
except in the special case where the homeowner set the fire or arranged for it to be set. Her rates 
may go up in the future, and she may be classified as a "bad risk," but she is not liable for the 
insured event. · 
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C. The Hungry Wolf Hypothesis 
A third justification for the extensive parental liability provisions 
is what Professor Jackson calls the "hungry wolf" hypothesis, which 
operates on the presumption that holding companies, left to their own 
devices, would prey upon and devour their regulated subsidiaries, 
therefore requiring close supervision.83 The hungry wolf idea focuses 
on the potential exploitation of the bank by the holding company for 
self-dealing or other conflict of interest transactions. Much of the fear 
that gives rise to the hungry wolf hypothesis is the legacy of the Senate 
hearings conducted in 1933 and 1934 to examine the development of 
the Great Depression. Upon closer examination, many of the horror 
stories that sensationalized those hearings do not hold up,84 yet the 
hearings continue to have an influence on banking policy.85 
The potential conflicts of interest that tempt bank holding compa­
nies to exploit their subsidiaries and their customers were termed 
"subtle hazards" in Investment Company Institute v. Camp. 86 Possible 
subtle hazards that have been identified in the scholarly treatment of 
the subject include (1) the potential for biased advice to clients 
designed to benefit the holding company's nonbanking operations; (2) 
uneconomical transfers, such as bank loans to troubled holding com­
pany subsidiaries; (3) bank trust department securities transactions 
designed to bolster the offerings of an investment bank affiliate; (4) 
predatory practices and collusion between the bank and other affili­
ates designed to injure other competitors of the affiliates; (5) and the 
possibility of tying arrangements by which bank services and products 
would only be available in conjunction with the purchase of affiliates' 
products and services, perhaps at an above-market price.87 
83. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 564-68. 
84. See GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANK­
ING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL Acr REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED 4-5 (1990) (stating that after 
tracking down all the claims made by Senate staffer Ferdinand Pecora in his 1939 book Wall 
Street Under Oath, Benston found that almost none of them are supported by evidence actually 
presented in the hearings). See generally Randall S. Kroznear & Rajan G. Raghuram, Is the 
Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933, 
84 AM. EcoN. REv. 810 (1994) (analyzing the sale of low-quality securities before and after the 
separation of commercial banking and investment banking and finding no evidence indicating 
that the Glass-Steagall Act had any effect on the problem). 
85. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 
46, 61-62 (1981) ("The legislative history reveals that securities firms associated with banks had 
engaged in perilous underwriting operations, stock speculation, and maintaining a market for the 
bank's own stock, often with the bank's resources."). 
86. 401 u.s. 617 (1971). 
87. See Fischel eta!., supra note 60, at 323-30 (discussing the "subtle hazards" suggested by 
the Camp decision); see also James R. Smoot, Striking Camp and Moving to Higher Ground: The 
Hazardous Subtleties of "Subtle Hazards" in Bank Regulation, 4 GEo. MAsoN L. REv. 21, 38-40 
(1995) (discussing "subtle hazards" in light of the Camp decision and the history of the Glass­
Steagall Act). 
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While there may be some anecdotal evidence that bank holding 
companies take advantage of their subsidiaries,88 there is no clear em­
pirical evidence that holding companies in fact exploit their banks to 
the extent feared by the hungry wolf model.89 The "subtle hazards" 
idea nevertheless continues to have force in the judicial decisions af­
fecting bank holding company activities90 and may also cloud the 
thinking of legislators confronting banking issues. To the extent the 
justification cannot withstand empirical scrutiny, however, it loses a 
great deal of persuasive effect. 
D. The Market Discipline Hypothesis 
The imposition of "market discipline" on bank management has 
also been offered as a justification for enhanced bank holding com­
pany obligations.91 The goal of market discipline is to create financial 
incentives for holding companies to monitor the managers of their 
banking subsidiaries and thereby dampen the risk-taking tendencies 
of the bank. The market discipline mechanism has been devised as a 
means to fill the gap left by traditional prophylactic regulatory ap­
proaches that have fallen short in the goal of tempering bank manag­
ers' appetite for risk.92 
The market discipline idea is really a response to the moral haz­
ard problem, that is, the persistent conflict between fixed-claim credi­
tors (especially depositors) and the equityholders (especially bank 
holding companies).93 Ostensibly, holding companies, as the residual 
88. See Kieran J. Fallon, Note, Source of Strength or Source of Weakness?: A Critique of the 
"Source-of-Strength" Doctrine in Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1383 (1991) (listing 
several ways in which bank holding companies might take advantage of their banking subsidiar­
ies); see also Gouvin, supra note 32, at 289-90 (1996) (noting the many situations in which parent 
corporations may take advantage of their subsidiaries). 
89. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 573-76 (reviewing and summarizing various studies con­
cerning the effect of bank holding company ownership on bank performance and finding "there 
is little evidence supporting, and a considerable amount rebutting, the hungry wolf justifica· 
tion."). Given the current regulatory "firewalls" in the bank holding company structure, even 
during the stock market crash of October 1987, insured bank subsidiaries of SEC-regulated se­
curities firms did not make improper advances to their parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates. See 
Thomas F. Huertas, Commentary, in REsTRuCTURING, supra note 52, at 211, 212. In fact, even 
back in the free-wheeling 1920s, large commercial banks and their investment bank affiliates 
fared much better than smaller banks that were only engaged in commercial banking. See BEN­
sTaN, supra note 84, at 32 (noting that national banks which engaged in both commercial and 
investment banking had a lower failure rate than those that just engaged in commercial 
banking). 
90. See Smoot, supra note 87, at 40-42 (citing a long string of cases that have employed the 
subtle hazards analysis). 
91. See generally Helen A. Garten, Market Discipline Revisited, 14 ANN. REv. BANKrNG L. 
187 (1995) (providing an overview of the market discipline debate). Professor Jackson describes 
a justification for holding company obligations that he labels the "Regulatory Deterioration Hy­
pothesis," which appears in its essential elements to be very similar to the market discipline 
justification. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 568-72. 
92. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 570. 
93. This conflict is known as the moral hazard problem. See Gouvin, supra note 15, at 312-
17 (providing a general overview of the moral hazard problem in the banking context). 
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takers, prefer relatively risky activities and assets (promising higher 
returns), while creditors prefer less risky activities and assets (provid­
ing a more stable return and helping assure repayment of the amounts 
owed). Because of this conflict, bank managers are constantly tempted 
to engage in "asset substitution"-that is, to replace low-risk assets 
with higher-risk assets that promise higher returns.94 By engaging in 
risky activity or substituting risky assets for conservative ones, bank 
equityholders in effect transfer wealth to themselves from their credi­
tors.95 Intuitively, it would appear that the moral hazard temptation 
would be felt more keenly when the bank has only one shareholder 
and that shareholder has both the incentive and the ability to exploit 
the situation.96 
Of course, the moral hazard problem is not unique to the bank 
holding company situation.97 In general, a moral hazard results when­
ever one actor or class of actors in a transaction can undertake risky 
behavior without fear of loss because the loss from the risky activity 
falls on a different actor or group of actors by contract or other ar­
rangement.98 All financial institutions, whether independent or within 
a bank holding company, closely held or widely held, face the same 
temptations.99 Yet only banks owned by holding companies are bur­
dened with the special shareholder liability enshrined in the banking 
regulation. 
94. See William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of 
Restructuring, 1989 DuKE L.J. 92, 112 (describing the idea of asset substitution in the corporate 
context generally); Patricia A. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgment Rule in 
Banking: Implications for Corporate Law, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1996) (describing 
the phenomenon of asset substitution in the banking context). 
95. See Fischel et al., supra note 60, at 314 (discussing moral hazard and providing an 
example). 
96. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 565-66; see also Gouvin, supra note 32, at 289-90 
(describing the pressure to do the parent company's bidding). 
97. In fact, "moral hazard" may be present in any number of situations from products lia­
bility and workers' compensation to bankruptcy and health care. The idea of moral hazard is 
present in any situation where the existence of some kind of insurance or cost shifting is per­
ceived to reduce the incentives to reduce or minimize loss. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of 
Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REv. 237, 238-40 (1996) (providing a history of the term "moral haz­
ard" and criticizing its use in the debate over the reform of various government programs on the 
ground that the conditions necessary to give the concept force in economic theory do not exist in 
the real world). 
98. See RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 120 (5th ed. 1998). Moral 
hazards are present in all transactions in which an actor may be shielded from liability by insur­
ance or by limited liability business forms. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Lim­
ited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 103-04 (1985). All corporations entail 
some moral risk, for example, because the limited liability form always presents opportunities to 
shift losses from the equityholders to creditors and other claimants. See id. 
99. Some empirical evidence suggests that stock ownership of thrift institutions in the 1980s 
resulted in riskier financial institutions than would have been the case if the industry had re­
mained primarily in the mutual form of ownership. See Lawrence R. Cordell et al., Corporate 
Ownership and the Thrift Crisis, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 719, 751-54 (1993) (noting that stock chartered 
thrifts and thrifts that converted from mutual to stock ownership were riskier and incurred 
higher losses than those that were owned in the mutual form, although conceding that the effects 
of regulatory missteps make the correlation less compelling). 
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Within limits, increasing managerial accountability may be a wor­
thy regulatory goal because management weaknesses undoubtedly 
contributed to the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s and early 
1990s.100 The goal of implementing more stringent management over­
sight, however, may be easier to state than to execute.101 The market 
discipline idea relies on the holding companies' vested interest in 
preventing losses at the holding company level to create incentives for 
monitoring the risk taking of their bank managers. Heightened over­
sight of bank management is likely to result in a more conservative 
bank management, but it remains to be seen whether increased moni­
toring by holding companies will result in fewer run-of-the-mill lapses 
of judgment that necessarily plague all human activity.102 It seems ob­
vious that even without the complicating presence of a moral. hazard, 
a certain number of mistakes will occur just because humans make 
mistakes, and bank directors are humans.103 
Even if monitoring management may be a marginally useful ap­
proach to reducing the risk of bank failure, when the policy is ex­
amined more closely, it fails to supply a compelling justification for 
100. The Congressional Budget Office reports that a study by the Office of the Controller of 
the Currency (OCC) found that so-called management-driven weaknesses played a "significant 
role" in the decline of 90% of the resolved and problem banks. See CoNGRESSIONAL BuDGET 
OFFICE, U.S. CoNGREss, THE CHANGING BusiNESS OF BANKING: A STUDY OF FAILED BANKS 
FROM 1987 TO 1992, at 19-20 (1994) [hereinafter CBO STUDY]. These management-driven weak­
nesses include everything from poorly followed loan policies, excessive loan growth, and over­
concentration in a particular industry to inadequate compliance systems, poor loan monitoring, 
and accounting deficiencies. It should be noted, however, that "[t]hese results do not imply that 
90 percent of bank losses can be attributed to management problems, nor does it mean that 
different management could have averted 90 percent of bank failures." !d. at 20. The OCC study 
found that 35% of the banks that failed did so due to "external economic conditions" such as 
inflation, recession, competition, and interest rate volatility. See id. 
101. Fixing corporate boards to make them more attentive to nonshareholder interests or at 
least less enthralled to the controlling shareholder by appointing outside directors, for example, 
is easier to discuss in the abstract than to implement in actual corporations. See Laura Lin, The 
Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evi­
dence, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 898, 940 (1996) (noting that the available empirical evidence does not 
conclusively indicate the degree to which outside directors have a meaningful impact on corpo­
rate governance but does suggest that independent boards are not a cure-all to problems of 
management accountability, although they do perform some checking functions). 
102. Generally, bank directors will not be liable for simple lapses of judgment. See, e.g., 
Muller v. Planter's Bank & Trust, 275 S.W. 750, 752 (Ark. 1925) (holding that bank directors 
must exercise good faith and diligence in managing a bank, but are not liable for mere exercise 
of poor judgment); Warren v. Robinson, 70 P. 989, 990 (Utah 1902) (holding .that directors will 
not be responsible for depreciation in value of bank stock when such depreciation results from 
errors of judgment). 
103. At least one knowledgeable observer is skeptical of the conventional wisdom that the 
moral hazard exacerbated by the presence of deposit insurance really explains the rash of inter­
national banking crises witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, says former FDIC Chairman 
L. William Seidman, the problems are more directly linked to flawed lending practices, espe­
cially in the real estate sector. See L. William Seidman, The World Financial System: Lessons 
Learned and Challenges Ahead, in 2 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INs. CoRP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIEs: 
LEsSoN FOR THE FUTURE 55, 58 (1997) ("[I]n looking around the world, the risks were taken 
without regard to whether the deposit insurance system was comprehensive as in the United 
States, minimal as in the UK, moderate as in Japan, or essentially non-existent as in New 
Zealand."). 
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holding company liability for at least two reasons. First, it amounts to 
closing the barn door after the horse has escaped. Changes in the reg­
ulatory scheme that make it much more difficult for banks to exploit 
the most pernicious manifestation of the moral hazard problem-us­
ing insured brokered deposits to fuel reckless banking practices­
should eliminate the most troubling aspect of the problem.104 
Second, the market discipline hypothesis may overstate the role 
that directors realistically can play in insuring the safety and sound­
ness of the institutions they manage.105 Generally, corporate directors' 
decisions are evaluated by the business judgment rule. They are not 
required by the law to do more than an ordinarily prudent person,106 
in a like position under similar circumstances, would do, acting in 
good faith, in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interest 
of the corporation.107 Except for some mostly antiquated cases to the 
contrary,108 bank directors are not held to a higher standard than cor­
porate directors generally.109 Of course, the duty of any corporate di­
rector is to be vigilant and attentive to the circumstances of the 
104. See Gouvin, supra note 15, at 314-17 (describing changes in bank regulation designed 
to thwart troubled banks from using insured deposits to fund risky activities). 
105. See id. at 345-50; see also John D. Hawke, Jr., The Limited Role of Directors in Assuring 
the Soundness of Banks, 6 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 285, 287 (1987) (arguing that bank directors 
typically have neither access to information nor the banking skills necessary for the effective 
prevention of bank failure). 
106. One must keep in mind that the "ordinarily prudent person" who serves as a bank 
director is typically not a banking professional and therefore has limited expertise in second­
guessing senior bank management. Small bank directors in particular are likely to be local busi­
ness people who are "neither ... expert[s] in banking nor ... professional manager[s]." Hawke, 
supra note 105, at 286. Even in well-run banks, it is difficult for directors to access and correctly 
interpret the kinds of information they need to properly run a bank, and even if they could, it is 
not feasible to expect directors to become involved in operational matters, such as determining 
the appropriate loan loss reserve or the writing down of loans. See id. at 288. The difficulties 
facing directors are even greater for the "outside" directors, who not only must rely on second­
hand information, but also operate under severe time constraints due to pressure from their 
other nonbank commitments. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Guidelines for the Unaffiliated 
Director of the Controlled Corporation, 44 Bus. LAW. 211, 212-13 (1988) (pointing out that 
outside directors face "practical difficulties" in fulfilling the review function, especially lack of 
access to relevant information); Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's 
Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1481, 1487-88 (1984); Hugh F. Sharber, 
Comment, A Realistic Duty of Care for Outside Bank Directors, 51 TENN. L. REv. 569, 573 
(1984). 
107. This is the standard imposed by the typical state corporate statute, see MoDEL Bus. 
CoRP. Acr § 8.30(a) (1994), and it derives in large part from an influential decision by the U.S. 
Supreme Court regarding the liabilities of bank directors. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 
152 (1891) (noting that bank directors must exercise the degree of care "which ordinarily pru­
dent and diligent men would exercise under similar circumstances," in light of "the restrictions of 
the statute and the usages of business"). 
108. See, e.g., Frrst Nat'! Bank v. Doherty, 161 S.W. 211,214 (Ky. 1913) (holding bank direc­
tors liable as trustees); Greenfield Sav. Bank v. Abercrombie, 97 N.E. 897, 899-900 (Mass. 1912) 
(treating bank directors as trustees to depositors). Cases like these have been roundly criticized. 
The modem view is that a special duty of care for bank directors is "unjustified and anachronis­
tic." See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GoVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 4.01(a) reporter's note 18, at 161 (Proposed Final Draft Mar. 31, 1992). 
109. But see McCoy, supra note 94, at 10-12 (arguing that courts have in fact modified the 
business judgment rule in banking to counteract the problem of asset substitution). 
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particular corporation and its business,110 and the circumstances of 
running a banking business may require a great deal of attention and 
care, but that is not to say that bank directors as bank directors owe a 
higher duty than, for example, directors of hospitals, securities firms, 
or automobile manufacturers. 
Even with the legal standard of care hanging over their heads, 
there is a limit to what directors can be expected to do. Their role is to 
set policy and to oversee the officers, not to engage in a hands-on 
supervision of operations.111 In light of that reality, the directors may 
be ineffectual in stopping operational problems. For example, if the 
officers of the bank are committing fraud or even just covering their 
mistakes, it will be extremely difficult for any monitor to detect, be it 
the board of directors or the holding company, because the officers 
can conceal information relatively easily.U2 Ironically, as banking pol­
icy moves in the direction of making directors and holding companies 
serve as watchdogs over bank officers, the officers may be even more 
tempted to conceal necessary information to avoid criticism.U3 
To the extent that some degree of market discipline from the 
equityholders is desirable, the enhanced capital standards governing 
banks put enough at stake for the equityholders to monitor bank man­
agement as well as they can.114 The biggest problem with the current 
extensive array of holding company obligations is that they are not 
well calibrated to exact the maximum amount of monitoring without 
unduly penalizing the holding companies. Beyond the heightened at­
tentiveness that the capital standards create, it seems doubtful that the 
enhanced holding company obligations can make the monitoring pro­
cess any more effective or make the role that management plays in 
maintaining a safe and sound bank any more meaningful. In short, as I 
have argued elsewhere, everything after the increased capital require­
ments results in diminishing returns m terms of enhanced 
monitoring.115 
110. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821 (N.J. 1981) (articulating the duty 
that "the directors must discharge their duties in good faith and act as ordinarily prudent persons 
would under similar circumstances in like positions"). 
111. Delaware corporate law seems, however, to be pointing in the direction that directors 
should have some system of compliance review in place to monitor corporate activities. See In re 
Caremark Int'l, Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 969-70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (writing a memorandum decision, 
Chancellor Allen suggested that Delaware Jaw and the dictates of federal sentencing guidelines, 
among other things, weigh in favor of requiring a corporation to have some form of legal compli­
ance oversight in place). But see Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 
1963) (setting forth the view that directors need not have in place "a corporate system of espio­
nage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists"). 
112. See Hawke, supra note 105, at 287. 
113. See id. 
114. There appears to be a strong connection between capital levels and thrift failure. See 
Cordell et al., supra note 99, at 724-27. "The ability to take on riskier investments at higher 
leverage ratios directly benefitted stock S&L owners, who could capitalize these benefits directly 
through appreciation of their stock holdings." ld. at 726. 
115. See Gouvin, supra note 15, at 350-53. 
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E. The Control/Enterprise Liability Rationale 
Another rationale for imposing subsidiary obligations on the par­
ent would be that in reality the two formally distinct legal entities are 
a single economic unit and should therefore be regulated as one enter­
prise. Professor Phillip Blumberg's extensive treatise, The Law of 
Corporate Groups, explores this line of reasoning as it plays out 
through many different legal techniques and in many different areas of 
lawY6 In the heavily regulated banking industry, for example, Profes­
sor Blumberg notes that the statutory scheme relies on the idea of 
common control as the basis for imposing enterprise principlesY7 
Why common control in the banking arena is enough to impose enter­
prise liability whereas common control in, for example, the modern 
corporate conglomerate is not, if ever, completely explained. Perhaps 
the reason is that bank holding company liability is politically feasible. 
After all, enterprise liability, in Professor Blumberg's words, "rest[s] 
on essentially pragmatic considerations rather than on any transcen­
dental legal concept."118 
Viewed through the lens of enterprise liability, the fiction of a 
separate corporate personality for each subsidiary in a corporate 
group must give way to the reality of a single economic enterprise. In 
the real world there is little practical difference between a wholly 
owned subsidiary and a traditional corporate division; therefore, it 
seems inappropriate that the legal treatment of one should differ from 
the other unless the goal of the law is to respect formal legal distinc­
tions above all elseY9 Proponents of enterprise liability argue that to 
116. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAw OF CoRPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS IN 
THE BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, INCLUD· 
lNG THE LAW OF CORPORATE GUARANTEES (1985) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, BANKRUPTCY]; 
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW 
OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATION (1983) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, PROCEDURAL]; 
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG & KuRT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF CoRPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF 
PARENT AND SuBSIDIARY CoRPORATIONS UNDER STATE STATUTORY LAw (1995) [hereinafter 
BLUMBERG & STRASSER, STATUTORY LAW: STATE]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPO· 
RATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY 
LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION (1989) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, STATUTORY LAW: GENERAL]; 
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF 
PARENT AND SuBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW SPECIFICALLY APPLYING 
ENTERPRISE PRINCIPLES (1992) [hereinafter BLUMBERG & STRASSER, STATUTORY LAW: SPE­
CIFIC]; PHILLIP I. BLuMBERG, THE LAw oF CoRPORATE GRouPs: TORT, CoNTRA=, AND 
OTHER CoMMON LAw PROBLEMS IN THE SuBSTANTIVE LAw OF PARENT AND SuBSIDIARY CoR­
PORATIONS (1987) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, SuBSTANTIVE CoMMON LAw]. 
117. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Deter­
mining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 295, 298 n.6 (1996). 
118. /d. at 299. 
119. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRu=uRE OF THE CoRPORATION 303 (1976). Propo­
nents of enterprise liability would say that not only does the traditional independent entity 
model of the corporation not reflect the real world, it also presents an obstacle to clear thought 
on the matter of how corporate groups should be treated under the law. See ELVIN R. LATTY, 
SuBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CoRPORATIONS 27 (1936) ("The defects of the intransigent con­
ceptualism which apparently accompanies the entity technique is of itself a source of danger in 
legal thinking."). 
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deal effectively with the legal issues of subsidiaries, the law needs to 
break out of traditional paradigms and embrace the idea of a corpo­
rate enterprise that cuts across particular legal entities.120 
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted an enterprise liability view of 
bank holding companies over fifty years ago in the case of Anderson v. 
Abbott. 121 The Court faced a conundrum in interpreting a banking 
statute that imposed an assessment on shareholders of national banks 
but was silent about any assessment on the shareholders of a bank 
holding company that owned a national bank. In a close decision, the 
Court decided that the assessment provision reached the shareholders 
of the holding company, reasoning that formal legal distinctions 
should not prevail over the reality of the situation.122 Anderson aside, 
however, judicial decisions invoking enterprise liability principles are 
comparatively rare. Nevertheless, the statutory scheme that regulates 
bank holding companies is informed by the enterprise liability idea. 
In the bank holding company context, the enterprise idea does 
not hold up as well as its supporters might hope. Banks that are part 
of a bank holding company must meet the same requirements that all 
banks do-capital requirements and regulatory restrictions among 
them-that prevent banks from being merely a component part of a 
larger enterprise. Because our banking scheme insists on treating the 
legal entity, which is the bank, with great formality, it does not com­
port well with the strong form of the enterprise liability idea. Banks 
are a very special kind of corporation. In a throwback to an earlier 
time, banking remains one of the few businesses where one must seek 
a charter from a governmental chartering authority before engaging in 
business.123 Banks are also special in that they must comply with regu­
latorily mandated capital requirements.124 In addition, the regulatory 
"firewalls" that separate banks from their affiliates in the bank hold­
ing company create two kinds of insulation-financial insulation125 
120. See Adolph Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 343, 350 
(1947) ("In effect what happens is that the court, for sufficient reason, has determined that 
though there are two personalities, there is but one enterprise; and that this enterprise has been 
so handled that it should respond, as a whole, for the debts of certain component elements of 
it."). 
121. 321 U.S. 349 (1944). 
122. See id. at 363. 
123. Modern banks seem to be products of the ancient "artificial entity" or "concession" 
theory of corporation. See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 
1800,2 HARV. L. REv. 105, 106 (1888). In a nutshell, that theory of corporateness holds that only 
the sovereign can give life to a new corporate being, and that the sovereign sometimes may 
create such a person if, as a quid pro quo, the new corporate person promises in its charter to 
perform some socially useful activity for the sovereign. See id. at 113·14. 
124. See Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R. 208 app. A (1998). 
125. Financial insulation includes such things as avoiding "subtle hazards," see supra notes 
86-90 and accompanying text, and those transactions prohibited by statute in §§ 23A or 23B of 
the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (1994). 
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and operational insulation126-that set banks off in their own special 
realm. As part of the regulatory approval process, banking regulators 
routinely require that a holding company's nonbanking affiliates be 
virtually independent from the bank.127 
All of this separation of banks from other affiliates in the holding 
company structure goes a long way toward making it impossible for 
holding companies to recognize any real synergies or economies of 
scope from their affiliation with a bank.l28 Yet despite all of the sepa­
rateness of banks and the restrictions on their ability to work together 
with other holding company affiliates, the law is quick to disregard the 
corporate form of the bank and to try through every means available 
to impose liability on the holding company for the obligations of the 
bank.129 In light of the special chartering, capital, and regulatory treat­
ment of banks, they seem to deserve more respect as impermeable 
corporate entities than the typical corporation, but they actually re­
ceive less. The current regulatory scheme makes the elaborate efforts 
to set banks off as independent entities within the holding company 
structure appear to be nothing but a charade. 
F. Political Explanation 
Although it would be intellectually satisfying and perhaps spiritu­
ally reaffirming to find a clear and coherent regulatory justification for 
enhanced holding company obligations that comports with traditional 
policy goals and withstands close scrutiny in light of empirical evi­
dence, we must be prepared for the possibility that no such justifica­
tion exists. 130 Public choice scholars would not hesitate to suggest that 
126. See Robert A. Eisenbeis, Commentary, in RESTRUCTURING, supra note 52, at 203, 206 
(describing the two types of insulation). 
127. The regulators often require the affiliates within a holding company, especially banks 
and their securities affiliates, to have separate boards, that banks in separate states have separate 
boards, and that affiliates within a bank holding company adhere to other "firewalls" designed to 
keep the holding company subsidiaries as "independent" as possible. See, e.g., Citicorp, New 
York, New York, Order Approving the Acquisition of Savings and Loan Association, 68 Fed. 
Res. Bull. 656, 656-60 (Oct. 1982) (conditioning regulatory approval of acquisition on, among 
other things, Citicorp operating its new subsidiary as a "separate, independent, profit-oriented 
corporate entity"). 
128. See Eisenbeis, supra note 126, at 206 ("Operational insulation would ... [deny banks] 
any synergies and scope economies that would come from having a sister broker-dealer 
affiliate."). 
129. See generally Gouvin, supra note 15, at 333-45 (discussing the myriad ways of imposing 
liability on bank holding companies). 
130. Cf R. DouGLAS ARNOLD, THE LoGic oF CoNGRESSIONAL ACTioN 47-51 (1990) 
(From a political point of view, an innocuous or fuzzily defined problem also carries with it the 
added benefit of being unlikely to come back to haunt the legislator in the next election.); 
Gouvin, supra note 46, at 1327-34 (discussing the systemic mechanisms that militate against a 
candid statement of policy rationale); Angus A. Macintyre, The Multiple Sources of Statutory 
Ambiguity: Tracing the Legislative Origins of Administrative Discretion, in ADMINISTRATIVE Dis­
CRETION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 67, 72-74 (Douglas H. Shumavon & H. 
Kenneth Hibbeln eds., 1986) (noting that proposals inust be set forth in somewhat opaque terms 
to keep their prospects for adoption alive). 
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the enhanced obligations are not the product of a well-planned regula­
tory scheme, but rather are merely the result of the give and take of 
the political marketplace.B1 The increased burdens on holding compa­
nies may have come about solely for political reasons-so that Con­
gress could say to a skeptical public, "we're getting tough on those fat 
cat holding companies." 
Although in Professor Jackson's view, a purely political rationale 
does not provide a regulatory justification for the law, it may provide 
the only meaningful explanation for the law.132 We should assess 
whether the regulatory justification we attribute to a given regulatory 
scheme is a legitimate expression of public policy or merely a post hoc 
rationalization of political action. Dressing up purely political action 
in terms that make it presentable as a legitimate regulatory decision 
when it was not in fact inspired by the purported justification is illegit­
imate.133 While we can criticize the poor fit between the action taken 
and the purported justification and argue that the action should not 
stand on its offered justification, sometimes it may be more productive 
to strip away the purported justification and see the legislation for 
131. The scholars who make up the public choice camp are a somewhat loosely knit group. 
Their perspectives on the law draw heavily on economics, game theory, organizational behavior, 
and political science. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIPP. FRICKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-33 (1991); SHAUN H. HEAP ET AL., THE THEORY OF 
CHOICE: A CRITICAL GuiDE 209-15 (1992) (giving a useful overview of the topic, especially of 
the theoretical problems of aggregating preferences, which tends to make the output of collec­
tive bodies incoherent); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public 
Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 878-79, 883, 901-06 (1987) (stating a general theory of "public 
choice" is impossible, because there are many variations on the set of core principles that have 
inspired many of the scholars). 
132. As Professor Jackson sees it, a regulatory justification rationalizes government inter­
vention as necessary to control undesirable private conduct. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 562. 
Certainly, there are theories of political justification. See JOHN RAwLS, PoLITICAL LIBERALISM 
146-68 (1993) (providing a theory of political justification based on the idea that the people 
supporting a political act endorse the act based on grounds supplied to them by their own moral, 
political, or religious views). A justification must be couched in politically acceptable terms, 
while an explanation is not so constrained. Some acts of legislatures may not in good faith be 
supportable by a public policy justification, although their adoption may nevertheless be ex­
plained as the convergence of various forces of self-interest. See Gouvin, supra note 46, at 1327-
34 (discussing the offered explanations for federal truth in savings legislation). 
133. Cf Gouvin, supra note 46, at 1327-34 (discussing lack of candor in the legislative pro­
cess). The subject of candor in the legal system has received extensive attention from legal schol­
ars examining the adjudication process. See Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing 
Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 1107, 1151 (1995) (noting that the Supreme Court's concern with 
stare decisis and other trappings of principled decisionmaking and concluding that it is appropri­
ate that decisions not only be principled, but that they appear principled as well); David L. 
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731, 736-38 (1987) (arguing that 
candor establishes the moral authority of the bench and the public trust necessary for the judici­
ary to function and acts as a restraint on judicial power by requiring a reasoned response to a 
reasoned argument); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. 
L.J. 353, 401 (1989) (suggesting that candor makes the law predictable by giving parties notice of 
the real basis for a court's decision and allowing other courts to follow suit). But see Scott Alt­
man, Beyond Candor, 89 MicH. L. REv. 296, 318-27 (1990) (stating that there may be pragmatic . 
reasons, such as creating the appearance of judicial restraint or decreasing the search time for 
judges and lawyers, for eschewing "introspective" candor and instead employing formalistic 
techniques of adjudication). 
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what it is-a rent-seeking wealth transfer from holding companies to 
politicians, policymakers, the deposit insurance fund, and indirectly, to 
the taxpayers.134 
At first blush, this explanation for holding company obligations 
sounds very similar to the cost-defraying justification discussed above, 
but it is different in at least two respects. First, the cost-defraying hy­
pothesis by its terms concerns itself with monetary outlays and the 
need to replenish the depleted insurance fund. In contrast, although 
transfers of actual dollars might be part of the political explanation, 
the transfers of importance to the political explanation might include 
a whole range of nonmonetary rents such as votes, good will, enhance­
ment of public image, and monetary support for political campaigns. 
Second, the cost-defraying hypothesis is the kind of justification that is 
appropriate for public dissemination, while the political justification 
would never be explicitly articulated.135 
The public choice perspective, of course, has its critics, many of 
whom make quite convincing arguments.136 But one does not need to 
be a dyed in the wool public choice theorist to hold the view that our 
regulatory system is subject to sway in the political winds and there­
fore produce incoherent outcomes. Supreme Court Justice Stephen 
Breyer, for instance, who is by no means an adherent of the public 
choice perspective, 137 has noted the disruptive effects of the political 
process on coherent regulatory policy in his book, Breaking the Vi-
134. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339, 343 (1988) 
(explaining that public choice scholars are likely to see statutes and regulations as products that 
are bought and sold in economic markets). 
135. Because policymakers realize they must be capable of justifying their actions in terms 
of widely held political values, they are prohibited from being candid about rent-seeking behav­
ior as a reason for a given legislative enactment. See Seidman, supra note 46, at 7 (stating that 
representatives understand that they must be able to justify their actions in terms of the ne­
orepublican ideal). 
136. Scholars have attacked the public choice position on the grounds that it lacks empirical 
support. See, e.g., Janet M. Grenzke, PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency Is 
Complex, 33 AM. J. PoL. Sc1. 1, 2 (1989); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical 
Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 
199, 236-68 (1988). Other scholars have criticized the methodology of the public choice approach 
for failing to give weight to legitimate concerns about the public interest that legislators may 
have and instead constructing an ex post explanation for legislative behavior based on who 
benefitted from the legislation. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the 
Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. 
REv. 672, 692 (1987); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the 
Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5-30 (1991). In addition, many scholars 
have questioned whether a worldview dominated by interest groups and excluding higher values 
runs the risk of becoming morally impoverished and ultimately politically illegitimate. See, e.g., 
Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the "Nobel" 
Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179, 180 (1988) (describing this criticism); Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and 
Disgust: Reflections on Public Choice, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 161, 162 (1989). 
137. See Ernest Gellhorn, Rationalizing Regulatory Reform, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1036-37 
(1983) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM (1982) and criticizing it for 
ignoring the perspectives of the public choice literature); Eric J. Gouvin, A Square Peg in a 
Vicious Circle: Stephen Breyer's Optimistic Prescription for the Regulatory Mess, 32 HARv. J. ON 
LEGIS. 473, 482-83 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: To-
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cious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation.138 Banking regulation 
appears to be a classic example of what Justice Breyer calls the "ran­
dom agenda" problem.B9 The random agenda problem develops 
when an agency's policies are not guided by rational experts but are 
instead driven by irrational public fears, politics, history, and even 
chance.140 Unfortunately, when a regulator gets trapped in the ran­
dom agenda problem not only does the agenda fail to address the 
problems that experts consider the most serious, the perceived 
problems that it does address change with the political winds. 
There is ample anecdotal evidence that the congressional and 
regulatory response to the thrift and banking crises of the late 1980s 
was fueled more by public sentiment than careful policy analysis.141 
Some believe that the regulators during the Reagan and Bush years 
were asleep at the switch or that the problems plaguing the system 
could be corrected with additional regulation.142 And more regulation 
is just what the banking industry got. The long list of regulatory weap­
ons devised for use against bank holding companies143 illustrates the 
kind of overreaction described by Justice Breyer.144 
But more regulation is not necessarily better regulation. The pol­
icy rationale for bank holding company regulation was already ob­
scure enough before the overreaction to the last banking crisis; piling 
on more regulation made the purpose of the regulatory scheme even 
more difficult to divine.145 If an incoherent politically driven impulse 
wARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) and criticizing Justice Breyer for failing to consider 
the public choice perspective). 
138. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFE=IVE RISK 
REGULATION passim (1993). 
139. See id. at 19. Justice Breyer's concern with agendas comports with the concern of other 
scholars who have studied the role of agendas in the legislative and regulatory process. The 
control of agendas can have a profound impact on the outcome of the policy process. See gener­
ally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 131, at 39-42; HEAP ET AL., supra note 131, at 249-58; 
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 13-14 
(1985}; Barbara Sinclair, Agenda Control and Policy Success: Ronald Reagan and the 97th House, 
10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 291, 300-10 (1985). 
140. See BREYER, supra note 138, at 20. Consistent with Justice Breyer's anecdotal reports 
on the hazardous substance regulatory agenda, an empirical study examining the EPA's 
rulemaking agenda concluded that pressure from Congress "distorts priorities and prevents real­
istic agenda setting and deadline compliance." Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory 
Agenda: Conclusions from an Empirical Study of EPA's Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress 
Projections, 53 Mo. L. REv. 521, 533 (1994}. 
141. For example, the public and Congress seem to have adopted the view that the thrift and 
banking crises were the result of widespread fraud, when in fact only 15% of the failures were 
attributable to fraud. See Albert R. Karr, In Cold Pursuit: RTC Chases Billions from Failed 
Thrifts, but Nets Small Change, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1994, at Al. 
142. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking Regulation, LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROBs., Winter 1993, at 7, 36 (describing the criticism of the regulators' role in the 1980s). 
143. See sources cited supra note 15. 
144. See BREYER, supra note 138, at 39-42. 
145. See Manuel A. Utset, The Discipline of Institutions and the Disciplining of Banks, 14 
ANN. REv. BANKING L. 211, 217 (1995} (saying of increased banking regulation, it "is as if we 
had a pair of glasses on and could not see very clearly, and proceeded to place five more pairs of 
glasses on top of the first one. After a while things become quite blurry."). 
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to regulate is the only explanation for the current scheme of bank 
holding company obligations, we ought to rethink the entire edifice 
and start from a new theoretical foundation. 
The justifications that have been offered for the imposition of en­
hanced obligations on bank holding companies are not compelling 
enough to disregard the corporate forms that make up the holding 
company structure. At present, the regulatory scheme lacks a princi­
pled rationale for ignoring the separate corporate entities in the hold­
ing company system. We turn now to the development of a better 
approach to bank holding company obligations. 
III. RETHINKING THE ExTENT oF HoLDING CoMPANY LIABILITY 
The current array of regulatory devices that impose liability on 
bank holding companies seems to be the product of an incoherent mix 
of theoretical justifications.146 The law does not seem to rest on one 
consistent view of the relationship between a bank and the holding 
company that owns it. Consequently, this lack of a clear justification 
results in a hodgepodge of regulatory devices that are trying to 
achieve the same goal, yet are inconsistent and apply in different situ­
ations. The source of strength doctrine,147 for example, is essentially 
an open-ended full liability regime that disregards traditional legal 
forms-in the nature of a true enterprise liability approach.148 In light 
of the difficulties the regulators have encountered in applying the 
source of strength doctrine,149 however, they have, with Congress's 
assistance, cobbled together a diverse collection of other devices that 
are not necessarily justified on the same grounds as the source of 
strength doctrine. 
The cross-guarantee provisions,150 for instance, appear to rest pri­
marily on the cost-defraying justification151 and only apply when the 
holding company owns more than one bank. Regulatory agreements, 
146. Although it is possible to view all of the holding company liability devices through one 
lens, such as the market discipline perspective, see Gouvin, supra note 15, at 333-45, each indi­
vidual device has its own regulatory justification and may or may not have been inspired by the 
market discipline idea. 
147. It should be noted that the source of strength doctrine is based on Federal Reserve 
Board policy, not on legislative mandate. The "source of strength" doctrine is codified in the 
FRB's Regulation Y, which states that "[a] bank holding company shall serve as a source of 
financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks." 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1996). 
148. See BLUMBERG, STATUTORY LAW, SPECIFIC, supra note 116, at 992-94; Sommer, supra 
note 9, at 229 ("[T)he banking industry utilizes legal devices that apparently confer legal person­
ality on the subsidiary without conferring limited liability on the parent."). 
149. See MCorp Fm., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852, 860-62 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd 
on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (finding that the FRB exceeded its statutory authority by 
using the source of strength doctrine to require a holding company to transfer funds to its subsid­
iary banks). See generally Bierman & Fraser, supra note 21 (addressing controversy surrounding 
the promulgation and application of the source of strength doctrine). 
150. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (1994). 
151. The cross-guarantee provisions permit the receiver of a failed institution to recover the 
costs incurred in resolving the failed institution from the sister banks within the holding corn-
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another approach to holding company liability, seem to be grounded 
more on the market discipline idea, 152 but also arise only in the con­
text of applications or other extraordinary events.153 Capital restora­
tion plans154 may be justified on specialness155 or market discipline156 
grounds, but again arise only in special situations and even then are 
not mandatory.157 The use of equitable subordination/58 prefer­
ence, 159 and fraudulent conveyance160 law in the holding company 
context would seem to be inspired primarily by the hungry wolf hy­
pothesis,161 but these approaches, too, only apply in certain appropri­
ate fact situations. Finally, the idea of a free-floating fiduciary duty to 
the banking regulators162 seems grounded on its own unique theory 
pany system. It is entirely geared to costs and has less explicit support under the other justifica­
tions discussed. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
152. Regulatory agreements generally focus on making sure that the party in control of the 
institution injects sufficient capital to exercise close monitoring of banking operations. These 
regulatory agreements sometimes take the form of an "affidavit" or "stipulation" signed by the 
party seeking control of the financial institution. Sometimes the agreement takes the form of 
letters between the regulator and the acquiring party, and, more recently, the agreements have 
taken the form of a formal "capital maintenance agreement," signed by the regulator and the 
acquiror. See Paul L. Lee, Liability of Bank Holding Companies, Savings and Loan Holding 
Companies and Their Affiliates for Failed Bank and Thrift Subsidiaries, in CouNSELLING CREDI­
TORS oF BANKS AND THRIFTs: DEALING wrrH THE FDIC AND RTC 379 (PLI Commercial Law 
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 561, 1991). 
153. For example, thrift regulators have the power to require persons seeking control of 
savings and loan associations to enter into a contractual version of the source of strength doc­
trine. See 12 C.F.R. § 571.6(d)(4) (1996) (describing imposition of net worth maintenance agree­
ments in connection with the requirements for obtaining a de novo charter for an association). 
154. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2) (1994). 
155. Institutions defined as "undercapitalized" are required to submit a Capital Restoration 
Plan to the institution's federal banking agency. See§ 1831o(e)(2)(D)(ii). To the extent the capi­
tal restoration idea is designed to prevent undercapitalized institutions from failing, it seems 
grounded on the specialness justification. 
156. The capital restoration plan approach is also designed to get holding companies more 
actively involved in the operation of their bank subsidiaries by raising the financial stakes of 
bank failure. If a bank holding company controls the undercapitalized financial institution, 
FDICIA prohibits regulatory approval of the Capital Restoration Plan unless the holding com­
pany guarantees compliance with the CRP for one year and provides adequate assurances of 
compliance. See § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii)(I). 
157. See Gauvin, supra note 15, at 338-39. 
158. The FDIC has adopted a policy of equitably subordinating the interaffiliate claims be­
tween banks and other members of the holding company family when resolving a failed bank. 
See, e.g., Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243, 1251-53 (N.D. Tex. 1990), 
rev'd, 954 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1992); MBank New Braunfels, N.A. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 
721 F. Supp. 120, 126 (N.D. Tex. 1989). 
159. See 12 U.S.C. § 91. 
160. The statutory standard permits a receiver or conservator for an insured depository in­
stitution to avoid certain transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the deposi­
tory institution, the FDIC or any other appropriate federal banking agency. See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(d)(17)(A). 
161. All three techniques are designed to undo interaffiliate transactions on the apparent 
ground that those transactions are unfair to other parties that have claims against the failed 
institution. This comports with the hungry wolf idea, see text accompanying supra notes 83-90. 
162. Some federal banking regulators have discussed the existence of a fiduciary duty run­
ning from the insured financial institution directly to the insurance fund. In a 1990 speech that 
drew analogies to the law of bankruptcy, Harris Weinstein, Chief Counsel to the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, concluded that insured banks and their fiduciaries owe the federal government a 
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but disregards some traditional precepts of corporate and banking 
law.163 Given the incoherence of this area, the whole range of ap­
proaches should be scrapped and replaced with a more defensible and 
coherent approach.164 
What is the appropriate degree of holding company liability? This 
part addresses this issue by examining possible liability schemes, start­
ing with the premise that some amount of holding company liability is 
desirable in some situations. First, the extremes-total liability or no 
liability for bank failure-are discussed. Next, the spectrum of liability 
schemes between these extremes is evaluated before finally develop­
ing the horizontal conflict justification. 
A. Examining the Extremes 
1. Strong Deference to Juridical Form 
In setting the appropriate balance between bank holding com­
pany and bank subsidiary liability, one could conceive of a scheme 
that respects the legal entities in the corporate family and does not 
impose the subsidiary's liabilities on the parent. Under such an ap­
proach, the only recourse available to a claimant with an unfulfilled 
claim against the subsidiary bank would be traditional piercing the 
veil jurisprudence, in which courts will disregard the corporate form 
when it is necessary to prevent "injustices or inequitable conse­
quences."165 PierCing the corporate veil is, and should be, a rare event. 
Although some commentators have suggested that courts may be 
more willing to pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiary to reach the 
general fiduciary duty "not to risk insolvency and the resulting loss of funds deposited with the 
institution." Speech by OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein on Duties of Depository Institution Fiducia­
ries, [July-Dec.] Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 511 (Sept. 24, 1990). 
163. See Baxter, supra note 142, at 16-21 (demonstrating that although a fiduciary duty to 
the regulator is theoretically plausible, Congress has already supplanted the need for a general 
fiduciary duty by enacting a detailed regulatory scheme and imposing the duty to act safely and 
soundly); Keith R. Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor's Toesies: A "Roguish" Concurrence with 
Professor Baxter, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs., Winter 1993, at 45, 56 (pointing out that the new 
fiduciary duty would be imposed on parties, such as attorneys, whose fiduciary duty runs only to 
the client, with no direction on how to accommodate the new duty); Andrew J. Nussbaum, Like 
Money in the Bank? An Economic Analysis of Fiduciary Duties to Protect the S&L Deposit 
Insurance Fund, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 355, 362-66 (1992) (employing portfolio theory to show the 
economic inefficiency of such a rule and its negative consequences). 
164. Others who have considered the idea have reached the same conclusion, although we 
differ in the details of how to replace the current system. See Bierman & Fraser, supra note 21, at 
281-84 (recommending repeal of the prompt corrective action provision and replacement of it 
with alternative deposit insurance reforms); Broome, supra note 29, at 967-1004 (reviewing the 
range of enhanced holding company obligations and concluding that the regulatory scheme 
would work better if the liability of holding companies were more open ended); Havard, supra 
note 28, at 2375-2412 (criticizing the source of strength doctrine, regulatory agreements, and the 
prompt corrective action provisions and suggesting the use of substantive consolidation of bank 
subsidiaries to shore up a failing bank); Jackson, supra note 24, app. at 615-16 (noting that the 
current approaches lack consistency and should be replaced by a more coherent approach to 
holding company obligations). 
165. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1991). 
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parent corporation, 166 a recent empirical study of reported cases does 
not support such a claim.167 
This scheme would be an unacceptable approach to holding com­
pany liability because in some situations bank subsidiaries may fail in 
part because they have acted in the holding company's behalf but did 
not commit a piercing the veil type bad act.168 For example, decisions 
that subsidiary bank's directors make may be focused primarily on 
shareholder profit maximization-a goal that is well established in 
corporate law as an important duty of directors169-but the result of 
that focus may be to neglect or reject other policy options that were 
beneficial to the corporate entity as an entityY0 The elevation of 
shareholder interests may be entirely legitimate without the other 
trappings necessary to make such action suspect under piercing the 
veil jurisprudence. Of course, a regime that respects legal forms could 
nevertheless in some cases reach a holding company if the subsidiary 
device was being employed as a way to "avoid a clear legislative pur­
pose."171 This approach might be used to reach bank holding compa-
166. See William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate 
Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REv. 837, 873 (1982); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FisCHEL, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCTIJRE oF CoRPORATE LAw 56 (1991) ("Courts' greater willing­
ness to allow creditors to reach the assets of corporate as opposed to personal shareholders is 
again consistent with economic principles."); Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 
TEx. L. REv. 979, 992-94 (1971) ("[C]ourts are probably more willing to 'pierce the corporate 
veil' when the defendant is a corporation rather than an individual."); Jonathan M. Landers, A 
Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 589,619 (1975) (suggesting that the idea of limited corporate liability was never historically 
intended to shield parent corporations from obligations of subsidiary corporations). 
167. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CoR­
NELL L. REv. 1036, 1056-57 (1991) (study found that of the 2000 reported cases analyzed, courts 
were actually less likely to pierce the corporate veil of a subsidiary to reach the corporate parent 
than they were to pierce the veil of a corporation to reach a shareholder that is a natural person). 
168. Some of the specific reasons courts have given for disregarding the separate legal per­
sonalities of corporations include to prevent an.unfair or inequitable result, "(1) when [the cor­
porate form] is used as a means of perpetrating fraud; (2) where a corporation is organized and 
operated as a mere tool or business conduit of another corporation; (3) where the corporate 
fiction is resorted to as a means of evading an existing legal obligation; ( 4) where the corporate 
fiction is employed to achieve or perpetuate monopoly; (5) where the corporate fiction is used to 
circumvent a statute; and (6) where the corporate fiction is relied on as a protection of crime or 
to justify wrong." Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271-72 (Tex. 1987) (footnotes 
omitted). 
169. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (providing the classic 
statement that "[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
the stockholders"). 
170. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 
1990) (acknowledging that the corporation's interests and the shareholders' interests do notal­
ways coincide by noting that: "The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the 
selection of a time frame for the achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated 
to the stockholders." (emphasis added)). 
171. See First Nat'! City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 
630 (1983) ("[T]he Court has consistently refused to give effect to the corporate form where it is 
interposed to defeat legislative policies."); Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 
432, 437 (1946) ("[C]orporate entities may be disregarded where they are made the implement 
for avoiding a clear legislative purpose."). 
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nies found to be involved in "unsafe or unsound" banking practices172 
or other activities that have been the subject of congressional ac­
tion.173 That mechanism for imposing liability on bank holding compa­
nies would probably prove very cumbersome in practice. 
2. Complete Enterprise Liability Treatment 
At the other extreme on the continuum of possible liability re­
gimes, one could conceive of a scheme where all of the liabilities of 
the bank subsidiaries are imposed directly on the holding company. 
As a policy matter, however, completely disregarding the corporate 
forms goes too far. There should be some significance to the legal for­
malities of separate corporate entities because the regulators make 
holding companies form these entities and respect the divisions be­
tween them.174 To ignore all of the corporate formalities would make 
the regulatorily mandated corporate structure nothing more than a 
costly charade. 
The most troublesome aspect of a completely open-ended enter­
prise liability scheme is the failure to give weight to bank capital re­
quirements. Banks are required to maintain significant capital on their 
balance sheets.175 On the other hand, most nonbanking firms in our 
economy are allowed to engage in business with no specific required 
amount of capitai.l76 When these unregulated nonbank firms fail, the 
law does not automatically impose liability on the equityholders of 
those firms. Ironically, while the law mandates levels of "adequate" 
capitalization for banks,177 it also automatically holds bank holding 
companies liable if a controlled bank fails. This is odd in the ex­
treme-why have the minimum capital requirements if the holding 
company cannot escape liability (or at least some of it) by maintaining 
an adequately capitalized subsidiary? If the capital requirements are 
172. See Overdrafts and Correspondent Banking Practices: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 50 (1977) (statement of George 
LeMaistre, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), quoted in EDwARD L. SYMONS, 
JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAw 553-54 (3d ed. 1991) ("Generally speaking, an 'unsafe or 
unsound' practice embraces any action, or lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted 
standards of prudent operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be ab­
normal risk or loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the insurance fund adminis­
tered by the corporation."). 
173. Cf Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944), discussed in supra text accompanying 
notes 121-23. 
174. See supra note 127. 
175. See Federal Reserve System Capital; Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. pt. 
208.13 & app. A (1998); FDIC Capital Maintenance; Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 
12 C.F.R. §§ 325.1-.105 (1998); Comptroller of the Currency Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 12 
C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.100 (1998). 
176. See BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 21 (3d ed. 1990) (not­
ing that U.S. law does not specify realistic, i.e., nonnominal, capital requirements for most corpo­
rations, but does make special rules for banks, insurance companies, and corporate trustees). 
177. The law classifies banks into five categories, "well capitalized," "adequately capital­
ized," "undercapitalized," "significantly undercapitalized," and "critically undercapitalized." See 
12 U.S.C. § 1831o (1994). 
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set at the appropriate level, they should provide sufficient protection 
for parties dealing with the bank without recourse to the holding com­
pany. Minimum capital requirements provide more protection for de­
positors and others dealing with the bank than most people receive 
from their employers, customers, or vendors, yet the owners of the 
bank receive little recognition for the benefit they provide. 
If heavy capital requirements do not result in heightened respect 
for the bank as a separate legal entity, the need for bank capital re­
quirements at all might legitimately be questioned in a holding com­
pany structure. Not only does the liability of holding companies in 
light of the capital requirements not make sense as a matter of logic, 
the application of such an approach creates a disparity between banks 
owned by holding companies and banks owned by individual share­
holders. In the former case, the regulators can access additional re­
sources of the holding company through several regulatory devices, 
while in the latter case, once the bank's capital is exhausted, the share­
holders are not personally liable for additional contributions to the 
failed enterprise.178 
Although banks sometimes fail because of conditions beyond 
anyone's control,179 the impetus to impose liability on bank holding 
companies seems to flow from the suspicion that when a bank fails the 
holding company must have had something to do with it. This is really 
a manifestation of the hungry wolf idea.180 The empirical evidence re­
futes the concerns that form the foundation ·of the hungry wolf hy­
pothesis, 181 so if this is the justification for the current scheme of 
holding company liability, the scheme ought to be reconsidered. On 
the other hand, if the bank does fail because of holding company 
abuse, the law should provide a mechanism to recover damages from 
178. Although there has been academic debate over the appropriateness of limited liability, 
corporations continue to provide limited liability to their shareholders in the ordinary course of 
events. For a review of one particularly vigorous debate, see Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REv. 387 passim (1992) (point­
ing out procedural obstacles to the Hansmann and Kraakman approach); and Joseph A. 
Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE 
L.J. 387, 411-15 (1992) (pointing out various dynamics present in the capital markets that would 
develop and likely frustrate the Hansmann and Kraakman approach). Cf Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 
1879 passim (1991) (suggesting an alternative regime to traditional limited liability). 
179. See CBO STUDY, supra note 100, at 20 (showing that at least 35% of all bank failures 
were attributable to "external economic conditions"). A series of papers commissioned by the 
FDIC concluded that the banking crises of the 1980s and 1990s were caused by a number of 
factors, including severe economic downturns caused by the collapse in energy prices, real es­
tate-related downturns, the agricultural recession of the early 1980s, an influx of banks chartered 
in the 1980s, prohibitions against branching that limited banks' ability to diversify their loan 
portfolios geographically and to fund growth through core deposits, and the failure of a single 
large bank in the state or a number of relatively large banks. See George Hanc, The Banking 
Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s: Summary and Implications, in 1 HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: 
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 3, 16 (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. ed., 1997). 
180. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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the holding company for the harm created by the holding company's 
abuse. 
Unless the holding company is in some way responsible for the 
financial distress of the bank, however, it is hard to justify placing fi­
nancial responsibility anywhere other than on the parties that had 
claims on the institution. In the nonbanking context, this is an uncon­
troversial proposition, because one of the primary reasons for forming 
subsidiaries is to limit the parent's liability.182 In recent years, a great 
deal has been written defending limited liability in the corporate con­
text.183 Although very little of that scholarship focuses specifically on 
the special case of subsidiary corporations,184 Professor Philip 
Blumberg has concluded that many of the theoretical factors justifying 
limited liability for corporations generally are irrelevant in the subsidi­
ary context.185 Others have argued that the limited liability aspect of 
the subsidiary is economically inefficient and therefore undesirable.186 
Even in light of the argument that subsidiaries do not make a compel­
ling case for the imposition of a limited liability regime, Congress and 
the FDIC nevertheless have recognized that there should be some 
limit to the exposure holding companies face as a result of the failure 
of a banking subsidiary. Congress has refused to disregard completely 
the corporate forms of banks and their parent holding companies de­
spite years of urging by the FDIC to require that holding companies 
182. See RoHRLICH, supra note 9, § 12.02, at 508-15 (citing various legal reasons for subsidi­
ary formation such as to limit liability, to avoid restrictions in the parent's charter or restrictions 
arising under law, for tax reasons, and to avoid complications arising from "foreign corporation" 
status; also citing nonlegal reasons such as increasing the morale of the subsidiary's management, 
settling shareholder disputes, and aiding public relations purposes). 
183. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 166, at 41-44; Richard A. Booth, Limited 
Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 140, 165 (1994) (viewing 
the primary purpose of limited liability to be the elimination of barriers between corporations 
and their creditors); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 
Mo. L. REv. 80, 130 (1991) (examining and rejecting the idea that limited liability is a privilege 
granted by the state; finding instead that limited liability is the product of private ordering and 
thereby compels the acceptance of the contract theory of the corporation). 
184. Exceptions include EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 166, at 56-57; Richard A. 
Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 499, 509-16 (1976); 
and, of course, BLUMBERG, SuBSTANTIVE COMMON LAw, supra note 116. Professor Blumberg 
has summarized the various advantages of limited liability as (1) permitting absentee investors to 
avoid exposure to risk; (2) permitting large-scale enterprise; (3) permitting diversification of 
portfolios; (4) avoiding increased agency costs; (5) avoiding impairment of the efficient capital 
market; (6) avoiding increased collection costs for creditors; (7) avoiding the costs of contracting 
around liability; and (8) encouraging risk taking. The disadvantages of limited liability generally 
are (1) unfairness and inefficiency for tort and other involuntary creditors; (2) unfairness and 
inefficiency for labor claimants; (3) the encouragement of excessive risk taking; ( 4) increased 
information and monitoring costs; (5) impairment of the efficiency of the market; and (6) the 
possibility of misrepresentation. See BLUMBERG, SuBSTANTIVE CoMMON LAw, supra note 116, 
§§ 402-403, at 66-84. 
185. See BLUMBERG, SuBSTANTIVE CoMMON LAw, supra note 116, § 5.01, at 93. 
186. See Sommer, supra note 9, at 231-42. 
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use all available assets-including the assets on nonbank subsidiar­
ies-to cover the costs of a failed bank.187 
Even though the FDIC would have preferred a congressionally 
endorsed open-ended enterprise liability regime, it eventually settled 
for implementation of the cross-guarantee provisions of FIRREA 188 
as the viable alternative to the approach it had originally supported. 
In justifying its support for cross guarantees, the FDIC noted that the 
open-ended source of strength approach disregards distinctions be­
tween the separate corporate entities within a bank holding company 
system and puts a bank holding company's nonbank assets at risk 
when a bank subsidiary fails. 189 The FDIC believed that this exposure 
of nonbanking assets could present a major obstacle to nonbanking 
firms entering the banking industry and could thereby present an ob­
stacle to increased competition.190 
As neither absolute respect for the legal entities in a holding com­
pany system nor complete disregard for the corporate entities seems 
appropriate, examining the continuum between the two extremes may 
yield a more defensible position. 
B. Exploring the Middle Ground 
If a scheme that has no respect for the corporate forms and a 
scheme that respects the corporate forms above all else are both unac­
ceptable, where should the line between the two extremes be drawn? 
It is possible for the law to fashion a scheme that both imposes liabil­
ity on parent corporations and gives an appropriate amount of respect 
to the corporate form. Applying some degree of holding company lia­
bility in appropriate contexts is not inconsistent with respecting corpo­
rate personality.191 First, in corporate law, the idea of complete 
187. For instance, the FDIC championed a bill in 1988 that would have given the FRB the 
power, at the FDIC's request, to compel bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries 
to transfer "such assets or services as are customarily utilized by a bank in the conduct of its 
business or operations" to failing banks owned by the holding company. Emergency Bank Con­
solidation Act of 1988, S. 2715, lOOth Cong., 134 Cong. Rec. S21,601 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1988). 
188. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (1994); supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
189. See FDIC, DEPOSIT INSURANCE FOR THE NINETIEs: MEETING THE CHALLENGE, ch. 7, 
at 33-34 (1989) (draft). It should be noted, however, that during 1986 and 1987, the last years for 
which reliable data is available, nonbank activities constituted a small part of the total assets of 
most banking organizations. NELLIE LIANG & DoNALD SAVAGE, BoARD OF GovERNORS OF 
THE FED. REsERVE SYs., NEw DATA ON THE PERFORMANCE oF NoNBANK SuBSIDIARIES oF 
BANK HoLDING CoMPANIES, STAFF STUDY 159, at 12 (1990). Some of the nation's largest bank­
ing institutions, however, have a very large commitment to nonbank activities, as evidenced by 
the fact that the top 100 bank holding companies required to report their nonbanking activities 
to the Federal Reserve Board held 99% of all the nonbanking assets reported. See id. 
190. See FDIC, supra note 189, at 33-34. 
191. The idea of subsidiaries as independent legal persons is tied up in 19th century ideas 
about corporate personality. Several excellent treatments of corporate theory examine the intel­
lectual history of the idea of the corporation. For general background on this topic, see HERBERT 
HoVENCAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 1-16 (1991); JAMES W. HURST, 
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSfNESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-
1970, at 4 (1970); Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corpora-
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limited liability for shareholders is a relatively recent development.192 
The relatively recent advent of limited shareholder liability is espe­
cially novel in the banking business, which until comparatively re­
cently imposed liability on shareholders in cases of bank failure. 193 Of 
course, courts will pierce the corporate veil when necessary to reach 
the shareholders of a corporation.194 
Second, imposing some obligations of subsidiaries directly on 
their parent corporations does not have to involve "piercing the 
veil"-but may instead respect traditional notions of corporate per­
sonality by relying on other legal theories such as agency law.195 It is 
arguable, for instance, that by the mere fact of the corporate family 
structure, subsidiary directors do not act independently in the best in­
terest of the subsidiary corporation, but instead merely do the bidding 
of the parent who placed them in the director position.196 Finding the 
parent liable for the acts of its agents who are serving as directors of 
subsidiary corporations does not constitute "piercing the veil" of the 
subsidiary.197 In fact, English company law has a mechanism specifi­
cally designed to reach this situation, the idea of the "shadow direc-
tions, 15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 283, 291·99 (1990); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The 
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.VA. L. REv. 173,178-83 (1985); David Millon, Theo­
ries of the Corporation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 201, 205-11. 
192. As Professor Blumberg has pointed out, the doctrine of limited liability for sharehold­
ers from corporate debts was not established until1830 in the United States and not until1855 in 
England. See Blumberg, supra note 117, at 297. More pointedly, Professor Horwitz has noted, 
It is not usually appreciated that truly limited shareholder liability was far from the norm in 
America even as late as 1900 .... [T]he distinction between the liability of the "members" of 
a corporation and a partnership, so clear to modern eyes, was still regarded rather as a 
matter of degree than of kind throughout the nineteenth century. 
Horwitz, supra note 191, at 208. Not only were shareholders not protected from liability, but in 
some industries, notably insurance, directors could also be personally liable for corporate acts. 
See EDWIN MERRICK DoDD, AMERICAN BusiNEss CoRPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 304-05 
(1954). 
193. See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 31 (describing the old approach to 
double liability for bank shareholders). 
194. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text. 
195. There is support in case law for treating agency as an alternative route to veil piercing 
for imposing liability on a parent corporation. See, e.g., Royal Indus. Ltd. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 
926 F. Supp. 407, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); National Council on Compensation Ins. v. Hopkins, No. 
1:92-CV-082, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21030, at *79-80 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 1995). 
196. One could argue that this article's assumption that subsidiary directors will only do the 
bidding of the corporate parent is not empirically sound. Evidence from some cases supports a 
contrary assertion. See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1119-20 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the different courses of action 
pursued by different boards of commonly controlled subsidiaries in the face of potential over­
reaching by the parent). It is worth noting, however, that even in Virginia Bankshares, the direc­
tors of one subsidiary acted as the holding company wanted them to act, without seriously 
questioning the holding company's position. Even if occasionally subsidiary directors will stand 
up to parental pressures, it would seem a fair assumption that such action places the directors in 
an especially uncomfortable position. Furthermore, the dilemma faced by subsidiary directors 
will not be automatically cured by a requirement that the directors be independent or "outside" 
directors, because the empirical data on outside directors as monitors is decidedly mixed. See 
Lin, supra note 101, at 939-61 (discussing empirical studies of outside director effectiveness). 
197. See Hamilton, supra note 166, at 983-84. 
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tor,"198 even though English courts notoriously loathe actually 
piercing the corporate veil.199 
Breaking through the legal entity of the subsidiary to reach the 
parent corporation may be appropriate in situations where the holding 
company has in some way contributed to the demise of the bank, even 
if only to the extent that the holding company's looming presence 
made the subsidiary's directors disregard their duties to nonshare­
holders, including their duty to act in the best interest of the bank as a 
bank. Given that there is some legal justification for imposing a duty 
on parent corporations, the issue of how much liability is appropriate 
still must be addressed. The question is difficult to answer without a 
rigorous regulatory justification to provide guidance. 
An acceptable regulatory justification must take into account, 
and create a mechanism to resolve, the catch-22 that currently faces 
bank managers. As presently structured, the banking regulatory 
scheme puts bank directors in an untenable position. Although the 
banking law is sometimes perceived to rest on enterprise liability prin­
ciples,200 it nevertheless also persists in at least giving lip service to the 
idea that bank holding companies and their subsidiaries are independ­
ent corporations.201 Treating banks simultaneously as both independ­
ent entities and mere components of the holding company enterprise 
creates some unfair results for the managers of bank subsidiaries. 
Directors of bank subsidiaries are judged by rules fashioned for 
the directors of independent corporations and as a result are often 
held liable for bank failures.202 Even though it is unrealistic to expect 
the directors of a subsidiary to make decisions that take into account 
any interests other than the shareholder's, the FDIC as receiver of the 
failed bank frequently asserts claims belonging to the bank for 
breaches of fiduciary duty arising out of the directors' failure to make 
decisions in the best interests of the bank as a bank.203 
Subsidiary bank directors' potential of personal liability204 for 
failure to act in the best interest of the bank creates a disincentive for 
198. See Daniel D. Prentice, Some Aspects of the Law Relating to Corporate Groups in the 
United Kingdom, 13 CoNN. J. INT'L L~05, 326 (1998) (describing the shadow director as a 
person, which can include a corporation, "in accordance with whose directions or instructions 
the directors of the company are accustomed to act" (quoting Insolvency Act, 1986, § 214(T) 
(Eng.))). 
199. See id. at 24-28 (discussing the reasons for the durability of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. 
Ltd., a landmark 19th-century case that refused to pierce the corporate veil). 
200. See BLUMBERG & STRASSER, STATUTORY LAW: SPECIFIC, supra note 116, at 992-94; 
Sommer, supra note 9, at 229 ("[T]he banking industry utilizes legal devices that apparently 
confer legal personality on the subsidiary without conferring limited liability on the parent."). 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 123-28. 
202. See Gouvin, supra note 32, at 288-92. 
203. See infra note 220. 
204. Although bank directors should be covered by directors' and officers' liability insur­
ance, the types of claims brought against them in these situations were often excluded from 
coverage. In many situations the specific claims asserted by the FDIC fall into the standard 
insurance exclusions for violations of regulations or for suits by the insured against itself. See M. 
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qualified persons to serve as directors205 and is unfair. The unfairness 
stems from the inappropriate application of the independent entity 
model to the subsidiary corporation and the failure to recognize that 
subsidiary directors are trapped in an intractable horizontal conflict. 
C. Developing the Horizontal Conflict Justification 
If banks are not special, they should be treated as other corpora­
tions are treated in the context of parent liability for subsidiary obliga­
tions.206 Unfortunately, how parents and subsidiaries are treated 
depends on a number of context-specific factors that elude concise 
formulation.207 In the context of wholly owned subsidiaries, including 
bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, however, one important 
dynamic should be taken into account: if subsidiary directors are to be 
charged with duties to nonshareholder constituencies,208 those duties 
Mazen Anbari, Comment, Banking on a Bailout: Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance 
Policy Exclusions in the Context of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 547, 551 
(1992); see also Chandler v. American Cas. Co., 833 F. Supp. 735, 737 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (deciding 
that claim by Resolution Trust Corporation is also within exclusion); Abifadel v. Cigna Ins. Co., 
9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910 (Ct. App. 1992) (regulatory agency directives do not constitute covered 
claims). But see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. American Cas. Co., 843 P.2d 1285, 1290-91 (Colo. 
1992) (stating that insurer's "regulatory exemption" deemed against public policy because it pro­
hibits the FDIC from bringing suit to protect the interest of depositors, creditors, and stockhold­
ers). For a general discussion of directors' and officers' liability insurance, see Joseph P. 
Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: 
An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 Bus. LAw. 573, 587-607 (1996); Bennett L. Ross, 
Note, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Insurance and Other Alternatives, 40 V AND. 
L. REv. 775, 775-76 (1987). In successful suits not covered by insurance, the recovery comes out 
of the directors' personal assets. 
205. Tht potentially tremendous personal exposure facing bank directors has. made the re­
cruitment of qualified directors increasingly difficult. See Dan Cordtz & Jennifer Reingold, The 
Vanishing Director, CoRP. FIN., Fall 1993, at 34, 34-40; Liability Concerns Shrink Pool of Direc­
tors, A.B.A. BANKING J., Oct. 1992, at 105; Barbara A. Rehm, Fearing Lawsuits, Bank Directors 
Take a Hike, BANKING WK., Jan. 6, 1992, at 1, 1. Even persons serving as "honorary" directors 
with such titles as "associate director," "advisory director," or "director emeritus" may find 
themselves subject to personal liability. See Charles M. Moore & Leonard H. Plog II, Honorary 
Directors of Financial Institutions: More Liability, Less Honor, 109 BANKING L.J. 233, 233-34 
(1992) (noting that persons who serve in such honorary positions can no longer assume that their 
titles alone shield them from liability). 
206. Of course, the parent-subsidiary relationship poses special problems for corporate law. 
See, e.g., Gouvin, supra note 32, at 287-94 (introducing', the theoretical inconsistencies in judging 
the actions of subsidiary directors under rules designed for directors of independent 
corporations). 
207. Professor Blumberg's exhaustive treatise provides evidence of this idea. The work dis­
cusses myriad approaches to enterprise liability in various situations. See sources cited supra 
note 116. Another of his books provides a concise overview of enterprise principles and adds a 
comparative law discussion. See generally PHILLIP l. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHAL· 
LENGE TO CORPORATION LAW (1993). 
208. Case law suggests that corporate directors generally may owe duties to a number of 
nonshareholder constituents, including creditors, depositors, insurance policy holders, and to the 
corporation itself as an entity separate and distinct from the shareholders. See Gouvin, supra 
note 32, at 297-300, 307-15. In some jurisdictions statutes require or at least permit corporate 
directors to consider the interests of nonshareholders when making corporate decisions. For a 
general discussion of corporate constituency statutes, see Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: 
Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 14 passim (1992) (offering 
a critical framework for interpreting the statutes); see also MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP 
 
No.3] HUNGRY WOLVES 989 
are likely to be neglected because the management of a subsidiary is 
frequently enslaved to the holding company. Although the existence 
of any real duty to nonshareholders may be subject to debate in the 
corporate law generally, banks and bank directors clearly owe duties 
to nonshareholders.209 Enhanced holding company obligations may be 
a useful way to redress the inequities resulting from the skewed incen­
tives of subsidiary managers to do the bidding of their holding com­
pany shareholders to the exclusion of all other fiduciary duties owed. 
The problem that subsidiary management faces is an example of 
what Professor Lawrence Mitchell calls a "horizontal conflict," that is, 
a conflict in which the bo·ard has competing duties to different corpo­
rate constituencies.210 Horizontal conflicts are those situations where 
directors owe duties to more than one constituency and are charged 
with making sure that all the constituencies get their due, even though 
the interests of the shareholder tend to dominate the decisionmaking 
process.211 Horizontal conflicts arise frequently in corporate govern-
AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 203-
04, 268-69 (1995) (arguing that corporations should be seen as an institutional relationship 
among many constituencies including shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers, and 
that the goal of the corporation should be to maximize wealth created by the enterprise, not just 
to maximize shareholder wealth). 
209. Banks and bank directors owe duties to such nonshareholders as customers, see Hoehn 
v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665, 672 (lOth Cir. 1944); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 
Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding that "(t]he relationship of bank to depositor is at 
least a quasi-fiduciary"); beneficiaries of trusts for which the bank served as trustee, see Fiduci­
ary Activities of National Banks, 12 C.F.R. § 9.2 (1998); and, in some cases, borrowers, see Bar­
rett v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20-21 (Ct. App. 1986); Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 
2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1986). In addition, directors may find themselves the targets of lawsuits insti­
tuted by nonshareholder constituents involved in the corporate enterprise, including cease-and­
desist proceedings by banking regulators, see 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1994) (permanent orders); 
§ 1818(c) (Supp. II 1994) (temporary orders); civil money penalties, § 1818(i)(2); removal or 
suspension, § 1818(e); and for gross negligence, § 1821(k), as well as by other parties, see FDIC 
v. Boone, 361 F. Supp. 133, 165 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (finding that directors may be subject to suit 
from the insurance company that bonds the bank if they act in an illegal, fraudulent, or negligent 
manner). See generally Norma Hildenbrand, D&O Liability: Expansion Via Regulation, 111 
BANKING L.J. 365 (1994) (examining federal statutory initiatives to broaden the liability of bank 
officers and directors). 
210. See Mitchell, supra note 31, at 603-07. 
These conflicts between virtually omnipotent managers and relatively powerless constitu­
ents of the corporation (or the corporation itself) can be described as "vertical conflicts of 
interest," since they exist between a powerful group and relatively powerless groups within 
the hierarchical corporate structure .... The exception to this unitary approach is the recent 
focus on conflicts among constituents, which has been sharpened by the dislocations caused 
by the takeover phenomenon. I term these conflicts, which exist among two or more rela­
tively powerless groups that have interests in the corporation, "horizontal conflicts." 
/d. at 591. 
211. See id. As Professor Mitchell has pointed out, the law has developed several methods 
to protect the corporation against director self-dealing, which Professor Mitchell refers to as a 
"vertical conflict." See id. For example, derivative suits are useful mechanisms to keep vertical 
conflicts in check because they allow shareholders to initiate an action to compel the directors to 
bring a legal action on behalf of the corporation and in some situations permit shareholders to 
prosecute the action without the involvement of the directors. See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER 
ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 5941.10 (perm. ed. 
rev. vol. 1995). There are, however, few mechanisms in place to ensure that directors properly 
discharge their duties to nonshareholder constituencies in the horizontal conflict situation. 
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ance.212 For example, in corporations with more than one class of 
stock, directors sometimes make decisions that benefit one class more 
than another class, even though the directors owe a fiduciary duty to 
all of the shareholders.213 Traditional corporate law has not satisfacto­
rily addressed these horizontal conflict situations.Z14 The incidence of 
horizontal conflicts multiplies when considering the duties that direc­
tors may owe to constituents other than the shareholders.215 
Although the directors may owe a duty to several different con­
stituencies, ordinarily the only group with standing to hold the direc­
tors accountable is the shareholders.Z16 The directors therefore tend to 
maximize shareholder interests to the exclusion of all others. Direc­
tors of wholly owned subsidiaries would seem to feel the pressure 
from shareholder wealth maximization a bit more keenly than the typ­
ical corporate director. Unlike the directors of a publicly traded cor­
poration whose shareholders may be widely scattered, poorly 
organized, and more likely to sell their stock than to bring a derivative 
suit, the directors of the wholly owned subsidiary have their one and 
only shareholder looking over their shoulders on a regular basis. The 
212. Horizontal conflicts arise as a result of the interplay of several threads of corporate law. 
The corporate law makes clear that directors are supposed to act in the best interests of the 
corporation, see Gouvin, supra note 32, at 298, supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text, and 
that the corporation consists of more than just the sum of its shareholders. See Gouvin, supra 
note 32, at 293; supra notes 54, 62-63 and accompanying text. At the same time, however, to 
remedy problems involving self-dealing, the law gives only shareholders standing to sue directors 
derivatively for breaches of duty to the corporation. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE Gov­
ERNANCE§ 7.02 (proposed final draft, 1992) (authorizing holders of "equity securities" (includ­
ing securities convertible into equity), and in some cases directors, to commence and maintain 
derivative actions). Traditionally, convertible security holders were denied standing. See Kusner 
v. First Penn. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276, 283-84 (E.D. Pa. 1975). But see Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52 
F.R.D. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Mere creditors have traditionally fared even worse than con­
vertible security holders. See Habermas v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 
1061 (Wash. 1987) (finding that bondholders have no standing to sue derivatively). 
213. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (And Why We 
Should Care About It), 51 Bus. LAw. 443,445-51 (1996) (describing the conflict between various 
classes of equity holders). 
214. See id. at 464-70. 
215. In addition to the duties that all directors owe to the corporation and to other constitu­
encies such as creditors, see generally Gauvin, supra note 32, at 297-300, 307-15, in the banking 
situation directors may owe additional fiduciary duties to depositors. See Hoehn v. Crews, 144 
F.2d 665 (lOth Cir. 1944); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 
(Ct. App. 1985) (finding that bank has "at least [a] quasi-fiduciary" relationship with depositors); 
to beneficiaries of trusts for which the bank served as trustee, see 12 C.F.R. § 9 (1994); and, in 
some cases, to borrowers, see Barrett v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20-21 (Cal. 1986); 
Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1986). For a discussion of those situations 
where a bank might be considered to have a fiduciary relationship with its customer, see Niels B. 
Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 21, 40-43 (1992). 
216. See, e.g., Tierman v. Barresi, 944 F. Supp. 35, 37 (D. Me. 1996) (holding that non­
shareholder has no standing to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty). The directors under­
stand well that the shareholders are the only group that can sue the board on behalf of the 
corporation. They understand that corporate control ultimately rests with the shareholders, who 
have the power to vote different directors into office. The result of the director-shareholder 
feedback loop is to focus director attention on shareholder interests to the exclusion of other 
interests. See Mitchell, supra note 31, at 605-06. But see supra note 209 and cases cited therein 
(evidencing duties owed to nonshareholders). 
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subsidiary's directors are subject to the control of the holding com­
pany, often because they are high-ranking employees of the holding 
company.217 In light of the dominant role played by the shareholder in 
the subsidiary's operation, it seems disingenuous to pretend that the 
subsidiary's directors can ever act truly independently of the wishes of 
the parent.218 The directors will rarely be able to fairly carry out their 
duties in the horizontal conflict situation, nor will they be able to dis­
charge their duty to some other constituency if such a duty is found to 
be owing. 
This situation leaves nonshareholders essentially without remedy 
in most situations. The problem of unresolved horizontal conflicts in 
the parent-subsidiary context is an especially pressing problem in the 
banking industry, where the vast majority of banks are wholly owned 
subsidiaries of bank holding companies.219 In the banking context, this 
means that if directors have been taking action in violation of their 
duty to act in the best interests of the bank as a bank, there is no 
effective policing method to put the directors in line. As a result, law­
suits to hold the directors accountable for failing to act in the best 
interest of the bank as a bank must wait until the bank fails and the 
receiver steps in to marshal the assets of the failed institution, includ­
ing any causes of action it may have had against its management.220 
The mismatch between the duty owed to all the constituents of the 
bank and the enforcement mechanism that allows only shareholders 
to bring derivative actions causes nonshareholder constituents to bear 
more than their share of the costs of director action. In effect, the 
mismatch produces negative economic externalities that are borne by 
the nonshareholder constituents, including depositors, borrowers, em­
ployees, and the deposit insurance fund.221 
217. See EISENBERG, supra note 119, at 299-300. 
218. The awkward position that "inside" directors of subsidiaries face does not give rise to a 
special rule for their fiduciary duties under traditional corporate law. The ABA Committee on 
Corporate Laws has clearly stated that the duties of affiliated and unaffiliated directors are the 
same. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 106, at 213. Nevertheless, the Committee 
also recognized that "while both affiliated and unaffiliated directors have the same duty to the 
controlled corporation, the affiliated directors cannot be expected to be wholly detached from 
the special objectives of the controlling shareholder." Id. at 212. 
219. In 1988, a total of 6503 bank holding companies controlled 9322 domestic commercial 
banks, representing 84.6% of the total number of banks and 90.2% of the bank deposits in the 
country. See Steven B. Long, Note, AMBAC: The Substantial Question Doctrine Under the Bank 
Holding Company Act, 79 GEo. L.J. 507, 507 n.1 (1991) (citing CoNFERENCE OF STATE BANK 
SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED BANKING 221 (1988)). In light of the tremen­
dous industry consolidation since the release of these figures, the percentage has likely 
increased. 
220. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1994). For a 
general discussion of suits by regulators based on claims against directors, see James T. Pitts et 
a!., FDIORTC Suits Against Bank and Thrift Officers and Director-Why Now, What's Left?, 63 
FoRDHAM L. REv. 2087, 2094-2102 (1995). 
221. See Mitchell, supra note 31, at 606; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm­
Specific Capita/Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 
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It stands to reason that because nonshareholder constituents of 
the bank have no effective method for holding directors accountable 
when directors fail to discharge their duties appropriately, their inter­
ests tend to be protected only when they coincide with the interests of 
the shareholders.222 In the banking context, that means if the bank 
directors should take action that is in the best interests of the bank as 
a bank, they will only do so if that action coincidently is the action that 
is in the best interest of the shareholder, the holding company. 
Consequently, much of the impetus behind the market discipline 
hypothesis as a justification for enhanced holding company liability is 
the realization that the most effective way to make bank management 
behave in a way that maximizes the benefit to the bank as a bank is to 
make the holding company's self-interest congruent with acting in the 
best interest of the bank as an entity. Certainly a big step in that direc­
tion was accomplished through the imposition of mandatory capital 
requirements. By making holding companies put a significant amount 
of equity capital at risk in their banking subsidiaries, the banking reg­
ulators believed, correctly, that the holding companies would be more 
attentive to bank manager risk taking.223 Yet the regulatory scheme 
goes far beyond capital requirements. Even after the significant capi­
tal investment has been wiped out, the holding company may still be 
liable. 
That portion of the regulatory arsenal seeking to impose costs on 
holding companies above and beyond the capital invested can be ex­
plained at least partially by the implicit assumption that the holding 
company should be made to suffer the costs of bank failure because it 
profited during the good times and because of the suspicion that the 
bank holding company was somehow responsible for the bank's fail­
ure. Yet regulations presumptively casting the holding company as the 
villain may be off the mark.224 Certainly some holding company­
owned banks fail due to macroeconomic conditions without any con­
tributing fault from poor managers or overreaching holding compa­
nies. In fact, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that thirty­
five percent of the banks that failed in the banking crisis of the late 
DuKE L.J. 173, 182 n.34 (1989) (implicitly acknowledging the existence of externalities in this 
situation). 
222. Lucian Bebchuk has argued that economically efficient statutes would take into ac­
count the interests of shareholders and nonshareholders alike, but the interstate competition for 
corporate charters results in the development of statutes that appeal to the people who choose 
where to incorporate, and those people will choose laws that maximize shareholder value. See 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on the State Com­
petition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1485 (1992). 
223. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDA· 
TIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS 12 (1991) (expressing the view that increased 
capital is the "single most powerful tool to make banks safer" and that "banks are less likely to 
take excessive risk when they have substantial amounts of their own money at stake"). 
224. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of empirical evidence 
for the hungry wolf hypothesis). 
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1980s did so for macroeconomic reasons.Z25 If a bank fails under those 
conditions without any foul play by the holding company, why should 
the banking regulators be permitted to recover anything from the 
bank holding company? Nevertheless, under the current regulatory 
scheme, the holding company has to contend with the source of 
strength doctrine and other enhanced obligations regardless of the 
fact that the holding company did not cause the failure and perhaps 
could have done little to prevent it. 
To find the right balance between respecting the separate legal 
entities of the bank and its holding company on the one hand, and 
imposing liability directly on the holding company on the other, regu­
lators need to take a more realistic view of the horizontal conflict 
problem. In light of the fact that the parent entirely controls the sub­
sidiary's management,226 it is unrealistic to expect the directors of sub­
sidiaries to act in an independent manner in the best interests of the 
subsidiary corporation even though such action would be required in 
the ordinary situation for corporate directors.Z27 Instead of imposing 
an unrealistic standard that would require subsidiary directors to be­
have as if they were truly independent, regulators should be more 
pragmatic and require them only to discharge their duty to act in the 
best interest of the parent-shareholder.228 
Because the subsidiary directors are not free to act indepen­
dently, it is unfair to expect them to meet larger obligations to non­
shareholder constituents. Given this reality, the law should treat 
subsidiary directors in accordance with their true status-as agents of 
the parent-and impose on them only the duty to act in the parent's 
best interests.Z29 In turn, the duties that directors of subsidiary corpo­
rations ordinarily would have been charged with had they been truly 
independent should be imposed directly on the parent corporation. By 
adopting this approach to the horizontal conflict problem, enterprise 
principles could supplement traditional entity law. Regulators could 
continue to recognize the legal separateness of subsidiaries, while sup­
plementing that idea with the understanding that as part of a corpo-
225. See CBO STUDY, supra note 100, at 20 (reporting on a study by the Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency that 35% of the banks that failed between 1987 and 1992 did so due to 
"external economic conditions" such as inflation, recession, competition, and interest rate 
volatility). 
226. See EISENBERG, supra note 119, at 299-300. 
227. See Gouvin, supra note 32, at 297-300. 
228. To do so would require a special rule of corporate law, however, because while placing 
shareholder interests first is appropriate in some contexts, it is not the usual director duty. See id. 
at 300-02. 
229. This is the position taken by the Delaware Supreme Court in Anadarko Petroleum 
Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988), and adopted as black-letter law in 
3 BETH A. BuDAY & GAIL A. O'GRADNEY, FLEcrCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF CoRPORATIONs 
§ 844.30 (1994), although it only cites Anadarko Petroleum for support. 
 
994 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1999 
rate group the duties of the directors should be passed on to the 
parent corporation.230 
The law of agency provides the basis for transferring those du­
ties.Z31 The directors of the subsidiary are essentially agents of the par­
ent corporation and because they are acting on the parent's behalf and 
subject to the parent's control, the relationship of principal and agent 
ought to apply. Although ordinarily directors of corporations are not 
considered to be agents of the shareholders,232 in the wholly owned 
subsidiary situation there ought to be a special rule. In the usual cor­
poration the shareholders may be too dispersed to be acting as a 
"principal" that could manifest consent to and exercise control over 
the directors as "agents," but in the wholly owned subsidiary situation,· 
the identity of the shareholder is well known, and, of course, the soli­
tary shareholder is capable of expressing consent and exercising con­
trol. Also in the usual corporation, key shareholders who are natural 
persons would sit on the board of directors themselves, but where the 
principal shareholder is not a natural person, the only way it can have 
representation on the board of its controlled corporation is through its 
agents. 
Another confounding factor in the traditional agency scheme or­
dinarily preventing directors from being considered agents of the 
shareholders is that the directors of a corporation are elected to make 
decisions for the corporation, not for the shareholders. Shareholders 
do not play an active role in the management of the corporation. They 
are empowered to vote for directors and to vote on fundamental mat­
ters, but otherwise they do not have a role to play. Therefore, ordina­
rily, there is not much that a person could do as an agent of the 
shareholders because the shareholders themselves have little to do, 
and the agent cannot have greater authority than his principal. In the 
case of the wholly owned subsidiary, however, the role of the share­
holder-holding company is different from the role of the traditional 
230. This is an idea that Professor Blumberg has considered in the context of liability for 
subsidiaries, although I am focusing here on the liabilities of the subsidiary directors as agents of 
the parent. See Blumberg, supra note 117, at 321-29. 
231. It is perhaps more appropriate to talk about the directors of the subsidiary as "quasi 
agents" rather than as true agents, because the traditional requirements for the agency are not 
always present. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) (defining agency as the 
"fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that 
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."). 
232. See id. § 14C cmt. b (noting that directors are not agents because they are not subject to 
control and because the duty owed by a director runs to the corporation and not to the share­
holders); see also MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANNOTATED 784-85 (3d ed. 1984), reprinted in RoB­
ERT W. fiAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, at 404-05 (6th ed. 1998) (noting that agency theory of 
corporate directors has been "generally rejected"). Nevertheless, directors sometimes do act like 
agents of the shareholders, and the law ought to recognize that phenomenon. For a discussion of 
the quasi-agency application in the enterprise liability context see BLUMBERG, PROCEDURAL, 
supra note 116, §§ 1.02.2, 4.02.1, 4.04.1, and BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW, supra 
note 116, §§ 6.06, 14.03.3. The idea of "quasi agency" may be developed more clearly in the 
pending revision to the Restatement of Agency. 
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shareholder of a widely held unaffiliated corporation. In the real 
world, a wholly owned subsidiary serves a role almost indistinguish­
able from the role played by a traditional corporate division; there­
fore, it seems anomalous that corporate law should treat two 
functionally very similar arrangements with widely disparate rules.233 
The idea of using agency (or agency-like) principles to hold share­
holders liable has been around for a long time234 and shows up in 
modern cases as well.235 Extending the agency idea to impose liability 
on holding companies for duties that the subsidiary directors failed to 
carry out nevertheless raises some awkward questions. Perhaps the 
most pressing question raised by the quasi-agency approach is why the 
consequences of agency should attach to one but not all of the dimen­
sions of the subsidiary director's position. In other words, if the sub­
sidiary's directors act as agents on behalf of the parent corporation, 
why would such an understanding of the parent-subsidiary-director re­
lationship not give rise to liability for the parent as principal for all 
obligations incurred formally by or on behalf of the subsidiary 
through the directors? 
The answer to this question also lies in agency. The scope of the 
agency would not include the authority to incur liability for the parent 
as a general agent; instead the subsidiary directors' agency would be 
limited to the role of performing the tasks ordinarily associated with 
acting as directors of a subsidiary. To see how this would work, it may 
be useful to examine the authority of the subsidiary directors as if they 
were traditional agents. First, as above, one could argue that the direc­
tors in this special situation are agents, even though directors of cor­
porations generally are not so considered. If these subsidiary directors 
are agents, one must ask, agents for what purpose? That is, what au­
thority do these agents have? Under the Restatement, authority 
comes in three types: actual, apparent, and inherent.236 
For an agent to have authority, there must be a manifestation of 
consent from the principal that the agent can reasonably interpret as 
creating authority to act.237 In the case of subsidiary directors, the 
agents have received express actual authority from the principal hold-
233. See EISENBERG, supra note 119, at 303. 
234. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) ("Dominion may be so 
complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be a 
principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the tests 
of honesty and justice."); Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 27 F. 625, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1886) (essen­
tially impressing the majority shareholders with the fiduciary duties of the directors). 
235. See, e.g., Royal Indus. Ltd. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 407,413 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(explaining that liability of a parent corporation should depend on whether the subsidiary was an 
agent for the parent and acting with actual or apparent authority); National Council on Compen­
sation Ins. v. Hopkins, No. 1192-CV-082, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21030, at *46 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 
19, 1995) (allowing RICO to impose liability on a corporate "person" for acts of its agents, 
including its corporate agents). 
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 140 (1958). 
237. See id. § 26. 
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ing company to serve the principal by running the subsidiary. In a 
sense, the relationship is similar to the proxy given by a shareholder to 
a proxy holder-a direction to attend the shareholders meeting and 
take the actions that a shareholder can take. In the subsidiary situa­
tion, however, the principal appoints "proxies" to serve in the role of 
director and to take the actions that directors take. Of course the 
holding company shareholder must resort to this device because, un­
like individual shareholders, the corporate shareholder itself cannot 
serve as a director-it needs natural persons to serve in that capacity. 
Appointment to the position of director of a subsidiary corporation 
could be reasonably interpreted by the agent directors as giving them 
the authority to act on the parent's behalf and in the parent's interest 
in running the corporate enterprise. Not everything the board of di­
rectors does would be authorized-only those things done within the 
confines of the management of the corporate enterprise. 
How would this agency affect third parties who deal with the sub­
sidiary directors-would they have claims against the parent as well 
based on the "agency" of the directors? They would not have liability 
if the authority argument is based solely on principles of actual au­
thority. The directors have been authorized to run the subsidiary-not 
to make direct obligations on the parent's behalf. This could be easily 
manipulated, however, with parents never admitting "actual" author­
ity to bind the parent even in egregious situations where the parent 
should be liable on agency principles. In that situation a third party 
could turn to the concept of apparent authority.238 
To find that an agent has apparent authority, the inquiry turns to 
whether the principal made manifestations of consent that a third per­
son could reasonably interpret as giving the purported agent the au­
thority to act.239 In the ordinary situation, however, assuming the 
subsidiary corporation is a respectable corporation in every other re­
spect-i.e., is well capitalized, is run as a separate business, observes 
corporate formalities, etc.-the actions of the directors do not create 
liability for the shareholders. Third parties know or should know that; 
therefore, it would not be a reasonable interpretation of the subsidiary 
director's position as creating the apparent authority to bind the 
shareholder of the subsidiary corporation. To allow third parties re­
covery in that situation would be a windfall, because it should be as­
sumed that they knew they were dealing with a corporation, albeit a 
subsidiary, and that ordinarily the liability of a corporation is not the 
liability of its shareholders.240 The legal form of the parties are impor-
238. See id. § 8. 
239. See id. § 27. 
240. In the view of the so-called contractarian theory of corporate law, the law in its many 
details spells out an elaborate contract between the affected parties. See generally EASTER­
BROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 166, at 1-39; Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the 
Corporation, 11 GEo. MASON L. REv. 99, 120-22 (1989). For a critique of the contractual theory, 
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tant aspects of the deal, and the law ought to respect the provisions of 
the contract that the parties have invoked.241 
Finally, it could be argued that directors of subsidiaries bind their 
principal through the concept of "inherent" authority. Inherent au­
thority is hard to pin down but seems to flow from the idea in section 
SA of the Restatement that one of the three ways an agent can bind 
her principal is solely by virtue of the "agency relation."242 Professor 
Melvin Eisenberg has proposed a workable test for inherent authority 
in which the acts of the agent are evaluated as reasonably foreseeable 
from the principal's point of view.243 In the case of subsidiary direc­
tors, this test would be unlikely to give rise to liability for the principal 
because in the typical situation it is not reasonably foreseeable that 
the actions of the directors of a controlled corporation will create lia­
bility for the shareholder. Therefore, without adoption of the horizon­
tal conflicts-agency approach, ordinary principles of agency law do not 
create liability for the parent corporation for ordinary corporate acts. 
Another question deserving attention is why, if the subsidiary is 
presumed to be so thoroughly dominated by the holding company, the 
subsidiary itself is not an agent of the parent, therefore logically re­
quiring imposition of liability on the parent for all of the subsidiary's 
obligations. This is a more difficult question, and it may turn out that 
in some circumstances the domination and control that the parent ex­
erts over the subsidiary are so complete that we ought to consider the 
subsidiary merely an agent of the parent.244 On the other hand, most 
subsidiaries are probably not dominated to that extent.245 Even in 
these subsidiaries, however, it is difficult for directors to act indepen­
dently of the parent, and the law should recognize that fact. 
The proposed agency approach to subsidiary director duties reha­
bilitates an otherwise properly functioning corporate entity that suf­
fers from the deficiency of not discharging duties to its 
nonshareholder constituents. The closest existing analogies are those 
cases where courts impose the fiduciary duties of subsidiary directors 
directly on majority shareholders, especially in the cases involving 
problems of "fair dealing" with minority shareholders of the subsidi-
see William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 
CoRNELL L. REv. 407 passim (1989). 
241. See Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1990) (voicing 
Judge Easterbrook's opinion that partnerships and corporations should be separate legal forms, 
the choice between which involves "many formalities" but which once selected should give rise 
to predictable legal consequences). 
242. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 8A (1958). 
243. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 15-16 
(2d ed. 1995). 
244. See BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW, supra note 116, § 6.06. 
245. The actual conduct of specific directors in specific situations may vary even within the 
same corporate family. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1119-20 (1991) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing markedly different reactions 
of two similarly situated subsidiaries to the same parent actor). 
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ary.246 An agency approach to the resolution of the horizontal conflict 
problem would really amount to nothing more than an expansion of 
the cases dealing with the duties of controlling shareholders, such as 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,247 Wright v. Heizer Corp. ,248 and Chiles v. 
Robertson.Z49 In Chiles, for instance, the directors of a group of sub­
sidiaries failed to discharge their fiduciary duty to the minority share­
holder of the subsidiaries. The court properly imposed the duty of the 
subsidiary's directors directly on the controlling shareholder.250 
In Sinclair, the Delaware Supreme Court expressly recognized 
that "[a] parent does indeed owe a fiduciary duty to its subsidiary 
when there are parent-subsidiary dealings."251 The decision explicitly 
noted that when a shareholder dominates a corporation and the selec­
tion of the corporation's board of directors, the dominating share­
holder should be charged with the duties ordinarily imposed on the 
directors.252 In that vein, Sinclair evaluated the parent's liability for 
certain parent-subsidiary transactions in light of the same standards 
that would have applied to independent directors in the same position. 
Sinclair's reasoning provides a logical and compelling rationale for im­
posing all the duties of a subsidiary's directors (other than the duty to 
act in the best interest of the shareholder) directly on the parent­
whether those duties run to minority shareholders, creditors, stake­
holders, or regulators. 
Similarly, in Wright v. Heizer Corp. the majority shareholder who 
controlled the board of directors caused the board to enter into a 
pledge of the controlled corporation's assets to the controlling share­
holder on terms that were unfair to the controlled corporation.253 In a 
derivative action by a minority shareholder, the controlling share­
holder was found liable.Z54 Cases where the controlling shareholder 
246. See, e.g., Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405,414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (recognizing 
that parent corporations owe the minority shareholders of their subsidiary corporations a fiduci­
ary duty and that the directors of the subsidiary placed there by the parent may be subject to the 
"intrinsic fairness" test to review self-dealing transactions in which the parent gets a benefit to 
the exclusion of the minority shareholder); Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1983) (stating that the majority shareholder bore the burden of proving by a prepon­
derance of the evidence that the cash-out merger was fair); accord Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & 
Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969) ("Majority shareholders may not use their power to control 
corporate activities to benefit themselves alone or in a manner detrimental to the minority."); 
Citron v. E.l. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500 (Del. Ch. 1990); see also John C. 
Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 823, 841-42 (1988). 
247. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
248. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977). 
249. 767 P.2d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
250. See id. at 911. 
251. Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720; accord Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 888 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1970). But see In re New York Ry. Corp., 82 F.2d 739, 741 (1936) (stating that 
where the controlling shareholder did not also control the board of directors, "there is no basis 
for the contention that the [controlling shareholder] was in any fiduciary relationship"). 
252. See Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 719. 
253. See Wright, 560 F.2d at 251. 
254. See id. 
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engages in overreaching at the expense of minority shareholders gen­
erally end with the parent corporation owing a duty to the minority 
shareholders of the subsidiary. A logical extension of that doctrine 
would require the parent to take on the duties that the subsidiary di­
rectors would have owed to any other constituencies as well.255 
One case taking this approach is Pioneer Annuity Life Insurance 
Co. v. National Equity Life Insurance Co. 256 It is an example of the 
type of holding company liability that a quasi-agency approach would 
require. Pioneer Annuity involved an insurance holding company that 
allegedly had systematically looted its subsidiary insurance company. 
When both parent and subsidiary ended up in receivership after the 
parent's misapplication of reinsurance premiums, the receiver of the 
subsidiary sued to impress a constructive trust on the reinsurance pre­
miums paid by the subsidiary to the parent.257 A judge on the Arizona 
Court of Appeals adopted the position that the parent corporation 
owed its subsidiary and "its cognizable communities of interest a fidu­
ciary duty to act fairly." 258 In overturning a grant of summary judg­
ment in favor of the parent, the Court of Appeals recognized that the 
fiduciary duty borne by the parent was owed to, among others, "poli­
cyholders and contract-holders" of the subsidiary.259 
The Pioneer Annuity court did not employ agency principles ex­
plicitly to impose the fiduciary duties of the corporation on the major­
ity shareholder. It offered no explicit legal theory to justify the action. 
The opinion cited two prior Arizona cases as support for the proposi­
tion that a majority shareholder owes a duty to the minority, but 
neither of those cases goes into any detail about why, as a matter of 
legal theory, that duty exists.260 More surprising, to the extent that the 
two cases are offered for support for the idea that a majority share­
holder owes a duty not just to the minority but also to the "cognizable 
communities of interest" of the corporation, the cited cases are ob­
scure at best. In Washington National Trust, the cited page lends sup­
port to the idea that a majority shareholder cannot appropriate to 
himself corporate assets "to the detriment of other stockholders. "261 
Nothing in Washington National Trust can be fairly read to give rise to 
a duty to the cognizable communities of interest of Pioneer Annuity 
Life. In Steinfield, however, the court states that "[t]he holder of the 
majority of the stock in a corporation owes to the other stockholders 
and the corporation the duty to exercise good faith, care and diligence, 
255. See supra notes 91-139 and accompanying text. 
256. 765 P.2d 550 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). 
257. See id. at 553. 
258. !d. at 555. 
259. !d. 
260. The cited cases are Washington National Trust Co. v. W.M. Dary Co., 568 P.2d 1069 
(Ariz. 1977), and Steinfield v. Copper States Mining Co., 290 P. 155 (Ariz. 1930). 
261. 568 P.2d at 1072 (emphasis added). 
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to conserve the property of the corporation, and to protect the inter­
ests of minority stockholders. "262 
Reading the word "corporation" broadly to include something 
other than just the sum of the shareholders, Steinfield offers support 
for Pioneer Annuity consistent with an expansive understanding of the 
corporate enterprise. Indeed, the Pioneer Annuity court cites the fa­
mous case, Pepper v. Litton,263 in the very next paragraph after the 
statement about a duty to the cognizable communities of interest. In 
Pepper, Justice Douglas stated that a director's fiduciary duty is 
"designed for the protection of the entire community of interests in the 
corporation."264 Although Pepper concerned the existence of a fiduci­
ary duty to creditors, when read broadly the case establishes the prin­
ciple that directors are not free to take action designed to maximize 
shareholder benefit if that action will be inequitable to the other con­
stituents who have a connection to the corporation. 
The idea that director duties in the insolvency situation extend 
beyond the interests of the shareholders as articulated in Pepper finds 
support in other case law. For instance, cases have held that directors 
must manage an insolvent corporation's assets with attention to the 
interests of creditors.265 Although the duty to consider the interests of 
creditors is not unbounded and the courts have grappled with apply­
ing such a duty in specific contexts,266 the idea of a duty to creditors 
has been extended to corporations merely in the "vicinity of insol­
vency" as well as those actually insolvent.267 
The central idea of Pioneer Annuity easily applies to the bank 
holding company situation. Bank directors should be impressed with a 
duty to act fairly with respect to the community of interests that 
262. 290 P. at 160 (emphasis added). 
263. 308 u.s. 295 (1939). 
264. 308 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added). 
265. See, e.g., In re STN Enter., 779 F.2d 901,904 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the directors of 
an insolvent corporation owe a fiduciary duty to creditors); New York Credit Men's Adjustment 
Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1953) (finding an obligation to protect property 
for creditors when corporation is insolvent or approaching insolvency). 
266. For example, it appears that the duty to creditors does not exist in the normal operation 
of the corporation. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 
1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to impose fiduciary duty of corporate directors in a case not 
involving insolvency or fraud); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 302-04 (Del. 1988) (finding that 
directors owe no fiduciary duty to convertible debenture holders); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 
215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133, 133-34 (Del. 1975) (finding that 
directors owe fiduciary duty to debenture holders only in "special circumstances" including in­
solvency, fraud, or illegality). But see Allied Indus. Int'l v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1516, 
1521 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (concluding that directors do owe a duty to creditors of the corporation). 
For a general discussion, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Cor­
porate Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 667; Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Govern­
ance, 41 Bus. LAw. 413 (1986); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 1988 J. 
CoRP. L. 205. 
267. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Ly­
onnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, 
at *1, 100-03 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
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makes up the bank-including such constituents as the depositors, 
borrowers, employees, and even the deposit insurance fund. If the di­
rectors fail to discharge those duties, the holding company should be 
held liable for the harm caused thereby. 
The benefit of the horizontal conflict approach is that is does not 
leave bank directors in constant fear of being second-guessed by regu­
lators or other litigants in the daily conduct of the banking business. 
The regulatory scheme should take special pains not to create disin­
centives to appropriate risk taking. The current scheme of holding 
company obligations, designed as they are to force holding companies 
to impose market discipline on bank directors, may result in excessive 
monitoring of bank management, which may produce negative conse­
quences.268 Bank managers may react by exercising too much caution, 
preferring to invest bank funds in, for example, government securities 
instead of extending credit to small businesses in the community.269 
On credit that they do extend, an oversensitivity to risk may result in 
higher pricing, overly conservative asset valuations, and higher loan 
loss reserves, which in turn could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy of 
closer regulatory scrutiny, examiner-ordered write downs, and ulti­
mately, a diminution in stock value long before the underlying credits 
warrant such actions.270 
Of course, the problem remains of how the affected non­
shareholder constituents may recover from the holding company for 
the directors' failure to discharge their duties to them. Heavily regu­
lated industries like banking provide probably the easiest case for this 
kind of recovery. The receivers of failed financial institutions have 
consistently pursued the most promising avenue-suits on behalf of 
the failed institution for failure to act in the best interests of the bank 
as a bank.271 Because the classic formulation of directors' duties is that 
268. Some commentators suggest that bank managers are already too cautious. See Garten, 
supra note 91, at 192; cf Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcom­
pliance, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1679, 1683-94 (1996) (discussing the problem of overcompliance or 
excessive caution among corporate employees faced with possible personal liability for corporate 
acts and arguing that such overcompliance is both economically inefficient and inappropriate as 
a matter of corrective justice). 
269. See Utset, supra note 145, at 222 ("Managers, realizing that their investment in human 
capital will be lost completely if they lose their jobs, will pay close attention to regulators' sig­
nals, in some cases becoming much more cautious than the regulators intended."). But see Mc­
Coy, supra note 94, at 58-60 (reviewing historical cases of bank director liability and concluding 
that she could find "little empirical evidence of long-term, undue risk aversion," although she 
conceded the likelihood of short-terll} risk-aversion to director liability rules). Professor Mc­
Coy's study obviously was hampered by her reliance only on reported cases to glean her conclu­
sions, and she could not assess the impact of rules on companies whose policies did not 
ultimately end in litigation. Given that there have historically been literally thousands of banks 
in the United States, it is somewhat suspect to conclude how the whole industry acted by extra­
polating from the relatively few reported cases on the books. See id. 
270. See Paul H. Irving & T. Hale Boggs, Financial Institution Directors: Mitigating Risks of 
Liability in Shareholder Actions, 109 BANKING L.J. 336, 349 (1992). 
271. See supra note 220. 
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they owe a duty to "the corporation and its shareholders"272 the re­
ceivers take advantage of the possibility that the directors have 
honored their duty to the shareholder at the expense of the duty to 
the corporation. 
Other than the receivership context, however, it is difficult for 
nonshareholder constituents to vindicate their rights. At present, 
courts only recognize the rights of equityholders to bring derivative 
suits on behalf of the corporation.273 To the extent the directors' duty 
to the "corporation" means a duty to the community of interests that 
makes the corporate enterprise successful-i.e., its employees, cus­
tomers, vendors, and even the communities in which they operate­
those stakeholders are without a legally recognized voice in the 
courts. Courts could change this by finding standing where none has 
been found before, but it seems more likely that if real change is to be 
made in this area, it will have to be through legislation. 
On this matter, Professor Lawrence Mitchell has argued that non­
shareholder constituents should be given standing to challenge direc­
tor action.274 In his scheme, an action taken by the directors that 
advances shareholder interests at the expense of the nonshareholder 
interests would have to pass a test similar to the one governing the 
relations between shareholders in closely held companies as articu­
lated in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home. 275 Specifically, the direc-
272. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (stating that directors owe "funda­
mental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders"); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 
510 (Del. 1939) (stating that directors are fiduciaries of the corporation and its shareholders); 
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) 
("[T]he directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its sharehold­
ers.") (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1989)); Midwest Management Corp. v. Stephens, 353 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Iowa 1984) ("[D]uty is 
owed the corporation and its shareholders whenever the actions of the director concern 'matters 
affecting the general well being of the corporation."'). This duty is sometimes imposed by stat­
ute. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CooE § 309 (West 1990) (stating that the duty is to the best interest of 
the corporation and its shareholders); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 717 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 
1995) (stating that directors consider the long-term and short-term interests of the corporation 
and its shareholders); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West 1981 & Supp. 1998) ("The 
directors and officers of a corporation shall exercise their powers and discharge their duties in 
good faith with a view to the interests of the corporation and of the shareholders .... "). But see 
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(a)(3) (West 1997) (stating that directors should consider the 
best interest of the corporation); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.156B, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 
1998) (stating that directors should consider the best interest of the corporation); 15 PA. CoNs. 
STAT. ANN. § 1712(a) (West 1994) (stating that directors "stand in a fiduciary relation to the 
corporation"). 
273. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE GovERNANCE § 7.02 (proposed final draft, 1992) 
(authorizing holders of "equity securities" (which includes securities convertible into equity), 
and in some cases directors, to commence and maintain derivative actions). Traditionally, con­
vertible security holders were denied standing. See Kusner v. First Pennsylvania Corp., 395 F. 
Supp. 276, 282-83 (E.D. Pa. 1975). But see Hoff v. Sprayregan, 52 F.R.D. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971). Mere creditors have traditionally fared even worse than convertible security holders. See 
Habermas v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 1061 (Wash. 1987) (stating that 
bondholders have no standing to sue derivatively). 
274. See Mitchell, supra note 31, at 634-36. 
275. 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
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tors would have to support the challenged action by offering a 
legitimate business purpose that justifies the action. The non­
shareholder constituents would then be permitted to show that the 
business purpose could have been achieved by a less harmful 
method.276 · 
Professor Mitchell's approach could provide a workable approach 
to resolving some horizontal conflicts, especially when the conflict is 
between the shareholders on one hand and a relatively well-recog­
nized nonshareholder constituency, such as creditors or the corpora­
tion itself, on the other. However, when the universe of possible 
constituent groups is made a little larger, to include employees, com­
munities, and others, for instance, the resolution of the horizontal con­
flict will not work as well. Under current case law, directors may or 
may not be justified in taking nonshareholder interests into account in 
the corporate decisionmaking process, depending on the context in 
which the decisions are made.277 Even in states that have explicit 
"other constituency" statutes,Z78 only one, Connecticut, requires that 
the directors consider nonshareholders in making their decisions, and 
even then only for publicly traded corporations in specific situa­
tions.Z79 Professor Mitchell's proposal will inevitably run roughshod 
over the well-established deference corporate jurisprudence gives to 
directors to make business decisions under the business judgment 
rule. At the same time, it would give little guidance to corporate direc­
tors seeking to properly discharge their duties and could only serve to 
expose directors to another layer of potential lawsuits if an affected 
group disagrees with the board's decision. 
In light of their current status in corporate law, nonshareholders 
may have to wait until courts adopt a more "communitarian" view of 
the corporation280 before they enjoy a meaningful mechanism to re-
276. See Mitchell, supra note 31, at 635-38. 
277. See Gouvin, supra note 32, at 310-12. 
278. At least 28 states have enacted other constituency statutes. For a tidy summary of these 
laws in tabular format, see Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Con­
stituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 163, 194-96 (1991). 
Maine's corporate constituency statute is fairly typical of the permissive, but not mandatory, 
nature of these provisions. It states that "[i]n discharging their duties, the directors and officers 
may, in considering the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, consider the effects 
of any action upon employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation, communities in 
which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located and other pertinent factors." 
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1998). 
279. Connecticut's "other constituency" provision appears to be unique in that it requires 
the board to take into consideration the "long term" interests of the corporation and its share­
holders, the interests of employees, customers, creditors, and suppliers, and "community and 
societal considerations" when making decisions in connection with the merger or the sale of 
substantially all the assets of a publicly traded Connecticut corporation. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 1997). 
280. For a general discussion of the communitarian idea, see William T. Allen, Contracts and 
Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1395, 1397-1401 (1993). See also 
David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REv. 1373, 1391-93 (1993) (providing a bibliography of communitarian scholarship in the 
  
1004 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1999 
cover from the holding company. In the meantime, however, even 
without taking the radical step of recognizing standing for such non­
shareholder constituents as employees, communities, and customers, 
transferring the recognized nonshareholder duties (especially the duty 
to creditors and the duty to the corporation as an entity) from the 
subsidiary's board of directors to the holding company serves to make 
the duties of the subsidiary board easier to articulate and execute. If 
this position were to be adopted, the existing Delaware law that direc­
tors of wholly owned subsidiaries owe a duty only to the parent corpo­
ration281 will be rationalized with those threads of corporate law that 
find duties to nonshareholders. 
IV. EXAMINING OTHER APPROACHES 
Several scholars have offered suggestions for improving the bank 
holding company liability scheme, but because all of those approaches 
rely on the traditional policy justifications discussed earlier in this arti­
cle,Z82 they fall short of achieving the right balance. The quasi-agency 
approach overcomes the shortcomings of the other approaches. 
A. Enhanced Holding Company Obligations Subject to a Limit 
Professor Howell Jackson has written quite persuasively that en­
hanced holding company obligations serve as an effective complement 
to traditional forms of regulation and help to ameliorate what he re­
fers to as the "regulatory deterioration" problem by shifting a part of 
the regulatory burden (monitoring risky bank management actions) 
corporate law field); David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 903, 905 (1988) (heralding the emergence of an approach to corporate law 
that seeks to address important questions about the relationship between corporations and 
society). 
281. See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988) 
(stating unequivocally that "in a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary context, the directors of 
the subsidiary are obligated only to manage the affairs of the subsidiary in the best interests of 
the parent and its shareholders"). The facts of Anadarko deserve some development. Anadarko 
Petroleum Corp. (Anadarko) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Panhandle Eastern Corp. (Pan­
handle). Panhandle and some of its other subsidiaries were engaged in the business of running 
natural gas pipelines. Anadarko was engaged in the business of developing and extracting oil. 
The board of Panhandle decided to divest itself of Anadarko by spinning off the subsidiary to the 
existing shareholders of Panhandle. After the spin-off, Anadarko shares would be listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange. In information distributed to its shareholders regarding this spin-off 
transaction, Panhandle indicated that it would continue to do business with Anadarko after the 
spin-off. Toward that end, prior to the spin-off, Panhandle and Anadarko renegotiated several 
intracorporate contracts that existed between them, with the result that the renegotiated con­
tracts were much more favorable to Panhandle than they had been. After the spin-off, 
Anadarko's new board of directors sued Panhandle to void the renegotiated contracts. See id. at 
1173-74. The court did not impose a burden of showing "entire fairness" on Panhandle, however, 
because that duty would arise only if Panhandle and the original Anadarko board had held a 
fiduciary position with respect to the future stockholders of Anadarko and had engaged in self­
dealing to the detriment of those shareholders. The court found no such duty. See id. at 1177. 
282. See supra notes 44-145 and accompanying text (Part II). 
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onto holding companies,283 which, after all, have a much more thor­
ough understanding of the business of banking than government regu­
lators will ever have.284 He has proposed a scheme of enhanced 
holding company obligations that would apply to all financial holding 
companies in all situations and would supplant the existing melange of 
regulatory devices. Exactly what the enhanced obligation would be is 
not clear, but Professor Jackson suggests that the obligation be limited 
to some ascertainable amount, such as five percent of the subsidiary's 
liabilities or existing capital requirements.285 
In exchange for the enhanced obligation of the holding company, 
Professor Jackson's plan would relieve holding companies from the 
existing burdens· of less efficient forms of enhanced obligations, such 
as high capital requirements.286 To avoid the problem of creating two 
classes of financial institutions-one backed by its shareholders and 
the other not-Professor Jackson would require that all institutions 
arrange for the satisfaction of the enhanced obligation either through 
the performance of a holding company with the financial capability to 
make good on the obligations or through the establishment of other 
guarantors, such as the insurance industry.287 
The biggest problem with Professor Jackson's approach is the 
matter of mandatory capital requirements. The serious capital stan­
dards that banks face have created great incentives for bank holding 
companies to monitor bank activity and may even have overcorrected 
the moral hazard problem.288 Professor Jackson seems to agree289 but 
thinks the mandated capital requirements are too high. Unfortunately; 
U.S. banks are bound to comply with rigorous capital requirements290 
which in turn are imposed in accordance with an international agree­
ment, the Basle Accord.291 
In light of these stringent capital requirements, holding compa­
nies already have the motivation they need to monitor bank manage­
ment. The mandated equity investment creates a great incentive for 
holding companies to carefully monitor and manage risk taking at the 
283. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 513 ("Unlike many traditional regulatory strategies, 
which depend on government officials to anticipate and prevent high-risk activities, enhanced 
obligations look, in the first instance, to financial holding companies to monitor and restrain 
risk-taking in their regulated subsidiaries."). 
284. See id. at 570. 
285. See id. at 616. 
286. See id. at 616-17. 
287. See id. at 617-18. 
288. See Gouvin, supra note 32, at 318-19. 
289. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 587 ("Increased capital requirements mitigate the moral 
hazard problem because they increase the stake that investors other than public claimants hold 
in financial institutions."). 
290. See id. 
291. See HAL S. Sco-rr & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONs, 
PoLICY AND REGULATION 257-89 (4th ed. 1997) (providing a history and overview of the Baste 
Accord and commentary regarding the impact of the Accord on the banking industry). 
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bank, a point which was well understood by the banking regulators 
when the enhanced capital proposals were being considered.292 
Although increased capital requirements raise some potential 
problems, especially determining how large a capital reserve is neces­
sary and ascertaining whether those capital requirements have been 
met,293 they appear to be for better or for worse a permanent part of 
the regulatory landscape. Especially in light of international agree­
ments, the capital requirements are not going to change for U.S. 
banks. While a proposal like Professor Jackson's, which calls for less 
regulatory precision than an accurate determination of the "right" 
amount of capital, may in some ways be preferable to a mandated 
capital standard, in the real world, banks will have to live with the 
capital requirements as they exist. 
I also do not agree that holding company liability can ever be 
properly calibrated, even theoretically, as Professor Howell has sug­
gested.294 Given the apparently chaotic295 nature of the financial serv­
ices market, it must be recognized that all regulatory devices 
employing holding company liability inevitably will be blunt instru­
ments, and the ramifications of their implementation will be impossi­
ble to predict accurately.296 Policymakers and bankers should just live 
with that fact. The quasi-agency approach leaves it to the regulators to 
set the capital requirements at appropriate levels to provide for the 
range of claims against the bank, with liability for the holding com­
pany only when the subsidiary bank fails to discharge a duty owed to 
nonshareholders. The overall effect of the change should be to reduce 
potential liability for bank holding companies owning well-run banks, 
thereby reducing the cost of capital and achieving some of the same 
292. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 78, at 
12 (expressing the view that increased capital is the "single most powerful tool to make banks 
safer" and that "banks are less likely to take excessive risk when they have substantial amounts 
of their own money at stake"). 
293. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 587-89. 
294. See id. at 599. 
295. Here, I am using the term "chaotic" in its mathematical sense to mean a complex non­
linear system whose output is dependent on a complicated array of initial inputs and whose 
output is extremely sensitive to the value of these inputs. See JoHN ALLEN PAULOS, BEYOND 
NuMERACY: RuMINATIONs oF A NuMBERs MAN 32-37 (1991). For a discussion of chaos theory 
and legal theory, see Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. 
REv. 641 (1996) (discussing chaos theory, path dependency, and efficient evolution as paradigms 
for thinking about the development of legal rules); for a general introduction to the topic of 
chaos theory, see generally JAMES GLEICK, CHAos: MAKING A NEw SciENCE (1988). 
296. Borrowing from the classic illustration of a chaotic function, a change in one input to a 
chaotic system, such as a change in regulatory costs, could have surprising effects on the outcome 
of the system. The classic example is the so-called butterfly effect, positing that in a chaotic 
system like the weather, the output is dependent on the initial inputs such that a butterfly flap­
ping its wings in Peking might be responsible for a tornado that strikes the United States. For all 
we know the function that defines the price of rice in Peking could depend on the extent of 
holding company liability in U.S. banking corporations and vice versa. Cf PAuLos, supra note 
295, at 33-34. 
  
No.3] HUNGRY WOLVES 1007 
relief sought by Professor Jackson, but within the confines of the ex­
isting capital scheme. 
B. Enhanced Cross-Guarantee Provisions 
In another approach, Professor Havard also thinks that the regu­
latory scheme should include broad latitude to reach holding company 
assets.297 In her view, however, the attempts by the Congress and the 
regulators to shift the risk of loss from failed banks onto bank holding 
companies has come up short.298 While she sees the prompt corrective 
action provision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im­
provement Act (FDICIA)299 requiring bank holding companies to file 
capital restoration plans to be a step in the right direction,300 she finds 
key provisions to be vague,301 potentially leading to trouble in en­
forcement. More importantly, however, she finds the lack of a provi­
sion requiring the holding company to guarantee the capital 
restoration plan to be ''ineffective and unfair" in those situations 
where a holding Gompany has exploited the subsidiary bank.302 
To remedy this failure, at the time that prompt corrective action 
would be appropriate, i.e., when the bank becomes capital deficient, 
Professor Harvard would inquire into the extent to which the holding 
company has treated the bank subsidiary as part of a larger enterprise 
or otherwise failed to respect its independent legal status.303 Her ap­
proach rests on a regulatory justification that appears to be an amalga­
mation of the. hungry wolf ·and enterprise liability justifications for 
holding company obligations: Under her proposal, the federal banking 
regulators would not have unconditional access to the entire pool of 
holding company assets, but instead the holding company would be 
liable only when such liability is warranted by improper domination of 
the subsidiary by the parent. If the regulators find sufficient control, 
she would give the regulators the authority to require the consolida­
tion of all the holding company's banking subsidiaries into one func­
tional bank. 304 
297. See Havard, supra note 28, at 2358. 
298. She points out that the source of strength doctrine may be beyond the authority of the 
Federal Reserve Board, see id. at 2383-85, and that some regulatory agreements may be unen­
forceable. See id. at 2372-75. 
299. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (1994). 
300. See Havard, supra note 28, at 2386. 
301. See id. at 2388-90. 
302. See id. at 2390-91. 
303. See id. at 2408-11. To determine if the parent's domination was improper, she offers 
several factors that she considers relevant to the inquiry: 
(1) whether the parent company refers to all of the subsidiaries as a unit of the parent; (2) 
whether the parent company is responsible for the policymaking of all of the subsidiaries; 
(3) whether the parent company owns a majority of stock in all of the subsidiaries; (4) 
whether the parent company and the subsidiary have common officers and directors; and (5) 
whether the parent company directs the daily operation of funds management. 
!d. at 2409. 
304. See id. at 2398-2402. 
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) 
Unfortunately, inquiring into subsidiary "independence" may not 
prove to be profitable. As I have discussed elsewhere, it is unrealistic 
to expect subsidiary directors to behave in a way that is truly "in­
dependent" of the parent's interests.305 Professor Havard's approach 
does, however, offer some worthwhile wrinkles in the bank holding 
company liability scheme. Focusing on the quality of the relationship 
between the bank and its parent is a good idea. But her approach does 
not go far enough. The quasi-agency approach is more promising be­
cause it assumes that the directors will act in the parent's interest and 
subject to the parent's control, thereby eliminating the need for a mul­
tifactor, fact-intensive inquiry. The quasi-agency approach only im­
poses duties on the parent that the bank directors have to 
nonshareholder constituents. Implicit in this approach is the idea that 
the holding company has benefitted from the subsidiary bank's failure 
to carry out nonshareholder duties and should therefore be liable for 
the damages caused by the dereliction of duties. By striking this bal­
ance, the quasi-agency approach achieves the underlying goal of Pro­
fessor Havard's approach. 
A second concern that plagues Professor Harvard's approach is 
the likely demise of the multibank holding company.306 While she 
would combine the holding company's bank subsidiaries to make one 
functional bank all the assets of which would be available to the regu­
lators, she does not deal with the changes in branching and interstate 
banking that may presage the end of the multi bank bank holding com­
pany era.3°7 As of the end of 1994, there were no more unit banking 
states and only two states that did not permit branching on a state­
wide basis.3°8 
Another criticism of Professor Havard's approach is that it would 
cause otherwise solvent banks to fail merely because one of the bank­
ing units is in trouble. In a sense, this is what happens now under the 
existing cross-guarantee provisions.3°9 It would seem to make more 
sense to impose a duty on the holding company to make good the 
damage done and let the holding company figure out where the re­
sources to satisfy that obligation would come from. 
305. See Gouvin, supra note 32, at 289-94. 
306. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
307. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified throughout 12 U.S.C.), permits nationwide branching after June 
1, 1997, thereby negating the requirement that holding companies operating in several states 
have a bank chartered in each of those states. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
308. See Arne!, supra note 2, at 3. 
309. Exactly this situation unfolded when the Bank of New England collapsed in the late 
1980s. Under the cross-guarantee provisions, BNE's healthy sister bank, Maine National Bank, 
was served with an assessment to make good the costs that the FDIC anticipated in bailing out 
BNE. The assessment was sufficient to render Maine National, which until that point had been a 
relatively solid institution, insolvent as well. See William F. Sheehan & Celestine R. McConville, 
FIR REA's Cross-Guarantee Provisions, Solvent Banks, and the Fifth Amendment, 112 BANKING 
L.J. 574, 575-76 (1995). 
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C. True Enterprise Liability 
If the goal is to ensure that every claimant of a failed bank has 
recourse against as many resources associated with the banking activ­
ity as possible, a scheme should be employed by which the entire hold­
ing company is regarded as one economic unit, and the formal legal 
distinctions between and among its various affiliates are treated as 
mere technicalities. This is essentially the approach embraced by Pro­
fessor Broome. In her view, the whole bank holding company struc­
ture should be treated as one enterprise and the legal distinctions 
between the corporate forms should be ignored.310 Her proposal is 
designed to remedy what she perceives to be a failure of the current 
regulatory scheme to eliminate the moral hazard problem, as revealed 
in the following passage: 
[T]he new statutes still contain limits on bank holding company 
liability, although the limits are larger than under the prior 
scheme. The closer the insolvent bank's negative net worth is to 
the liability limit, the more likely the bank holding company is to 
encourage bank managers to engage in risky activities at the 
FDIC's expense. The bank holding company again becomes indif­
ferent about the amounts of bank insolvency loss in excess of its 
own liability.311 
Although she notes that banks will have little incentive to seek 
prompt closure of an insolvent banP12-a debatable point given the 
liability limitation rules in the prompt corrective action provi­
sions313-she does little to explain why the banking regulators will not 
act quickly to close insolvent institutions as they have been authorized 
to do by FDICIA other than to note that the decision to close an 
institution is fraught with political considerations.314 
Professor Broome's proposal to create what she calls "Holding 
Company Family Liability"315 amounts to open-ended liability for a 
bank holding company and all its subsidiaries (both those engaged in 
banking and those in non banking businesses) for the costs of bank 
failure. She quickly dismisses the criticisms of commentators who ar­
gue that such a scheme is too inconsistent with traditional notions of 
corporate entity law316 without making any attempt to rationalize 
310. See Broome, supra note 29, at 996-97 (describing the "holding company family liability 
provision"). 
311. Jd. at 991. 
312. See id. at 953-55. 
313. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(E) (1994). By guaranteeing a subsidiary's obligation under 
a capital restoration plan a holding company limits its direct liability for the institution's failure 
to the lower of either "an amount equal to 5 percent of the institution's total assets at the time 
the institution became undercapitalized" or "the amount which is necessary (or would have been 
necessary) to bring the institution into compliance with all capital standards applicable" at the 
time the institution failed to comply with the plan. Jd. 
314. See Broome, supra note 29, at 955. 
315. See id. at 996-97. 
316. See id. at 984-87. 
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banks' extensive capital requirements with a scheme where even well­
capitalized banks that ultimately fail automatically create liability for 
their shareholder. In explaining why disregard of corporate entities is 
appropriate in the bank holding company context, Professor Broome 
falls back on a hybrid version of the discredited "specialness" argu­
ment and the controversial cost-defraying hypothesis: "[a] bank sub­
sidiary's failure . . . 'imposes an external cost on the public by 
increasing FDIC losses and depleting the insurance fund,' so govern­
ment intervention into the normal limited liability scheme is justi­
fied."317 She does not, however, offer any argument in response to the 
many criticisms of the specialness and cost-defraying justifications,318 
nor does she explain why bank failure should be treated differently 
from the failures of other enterprises. If a key subsidiary of a commer­
cial holding company were to fail, for example, the Miller Brewing 
Company subsidiary of Philip Morris, it certainly would create a nega­
tive externality for the public through higher beer prices and higher 
unemployment, which translates into higher crime, higher public 
assistance costs, and other tax supported expenses. Yet, it would be 
highly unlikely that the government would seek to recover those costs 
from Philip Morris, Miller Brewing Company's corporate parent. 
For Professor Broome's terse justification for disregarding legal 
entities in the banking context to stand, it must establish that there is 
something "special" about banks that requires treatment deviating 
from regular corporate practice. However, as discussed above, the ar­
guments in favor of bank specialness have not been especially 
persuasive.319 
Professor Broome's proposal never explicitly articulates the regu­
latory justification that animates it. She seems primarily motivated by 
the market discipline hypothesis because she seeks to eradicate all 
limitations that the holding company may enjoy from complete and 
total liability for the failure of the bank.320 Yet, she does not appreci­
ate the limits of the market discipline approach to prevent bank fail­
ure.321 Her proposal will not prevent banks that fail for 
macroeconomic reasons from failing, nor will it prevent managerial 
abuse that is effectively hidden from holding company oversight. 
What it will do is cause financial distress, if not failure, of brother-
317. See id. at 985 (quoting William R. Keeton, Bank Holding Companies, Cross-Bank 
Guarantees, and Source of Strength, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY EcoNOMIC RE­
SERVE, May-June 1990, at 55). 
318. See supra notes 51-82 and accompanying text. 
319. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
320. See Broome, supra note 29, at 1000 ("The family liability proposal, however, places no 
artificial limits on a holding company's liability. The only moral hazard remaining as the result of 
limited shareholder liability under the family liability proposal is that as the bank holding com­
pany itself approaches insolvency, with little or nothing to lose, it will be tempted to engage in 
risky activities with the possibility of sufficiently high returns that its shareholders will regain 
some value in their holding company investment."). 
321. See supra notes 91-115 and accompanying text. 
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sister businesses within the holding company structure merely because 
one subsidiary got into trouble. It will also result in the shareholder of 
that failed institution losing both its substantial capital investment and 
the value of all of the deposit insurance premiums paid because in a 
sense the deposit insurance will become illusory-the holding com­
pany will become the insurer of the deposit whether it played a role in 
the failure of the bank or not. 
The quasi-agency approach resolves these problems by according 
the corporate entities an appropriate amount of respect and by sup­
plementing that respect with enterprise liability principles when the 
bank's directors have acted in the holding company's interests to the 
exclusion of other constituents to which they owed a duty (including a 
duty to the bank itself as a legal entity). Professor Broome's concern 
about holding companies' "avoidance" of their obligations under cur­
rent law would also be addressed by a quasi-agency approach. The 
holding company would be liable for the breach of duties owed to 
nonshareholder constituents whenever they occurred (limited by rele­
vant statutes of limitation). So, selling a bank just before it becomes 
insolvent would not release a holding company from liability, which is 
another concern of Professor Broome's. 
D. Double Liability for Shareholders 
Historically, both state and federal banking law statutes imposed 
"double liability" on bank shareholders as a way to provide protection 
for parties with claims against the bank.322 The "double liability" was 
typically limited to the par value of the shares, but it was nevertheless 
an amount above and beyond the actual money invested by the share­
holders in the bank.323 In this way, the law provided a way for persons 
with claims against a failed bank to recover at least a portion of the 
amount owed by the institution in excess of its assets and capital. 
Although the scheme was designed to protect depositors and other 
fixed claimants, in the aftermath of the Great Depression it was 
widely perceived to have failed in that goal and was supplanted by 
government sponsored deposit insurance.324 After the double liability 
rule for national banks was repealed in 1959, the state statutes fol-
322. See generally John R. Vincens, On the Demise of Double Liability of Bank Sharehold­
ers, 12 Bus. LAw. 275, 275-76 (1957) (providing an overview of the rise and decline of the double 
liability idea). 
323. JYpical was the provision that used to be part of the National Bank Act, which read 
The shareholders of every national banking association shall be held individually responsi­
ble, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts and engagements 
of such association to the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value 
thereof, in addition to the amount invested in shares. 
/d. at 275 (quoting U.S. REv. STAT. § 5151 (1875) (repealed 1959)). 
324. See BLUMBERG, SuBSTANTIVE CoMMON LAw, supra note 116, at 49. 
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lowed suit and the double liability of bank shareholders became a 
dead letter.325 
Professors Macey and Miller have argued that double liability 
statutes provided an effective method for appropriately shifting bank 
failure loss to its owners and should be reconsidered as a regime for 
bank failure liability.326 Professors Macey and Miller's argument rests 
firmly on the moral hazard justification for holding company obliga­
tions and builds on their earlier work examining the moral hazard 
problem in banking, especially as exacerbated by deposit insurance.327 
According to Professors Macey and Miller, U.S. banking policy "took 
a wrong turn when it abandoned double liability for a system of gov­
ernmentally administered deposit insurance."328 In their view, double 
liability statutes provide an excellent method of correcting the moral 
hazard problem by creating incentives for bank managers to lower 
risky activities or suffer personal liability.329 They point to historical 
data to support the proposition that double liability was an effective 
check on bank managers' behavior, noting especially that before the 
advent of deposit insurance there were many more voluntary bank 
liquidations than involuntary.330 After reviewing the empirical evi­
dence and concluding that double liability was a success, Professors 
Macey and Miller draw the inference that the double liability works 
because the potential personal liability of the shareholders serves as 
"supplemental off-balance sheet capital" that the claimants against the 
bank took into account even though it was not reflected on the banks' 
balance sheets.331 Later studies have shown that double liability bank­
ing regimes in which creditors may recover from bank shareholders 
had the effect of reducing the costs of banking, perhaps by reducing 
the risk premium demanded by creditors.332 
Although Professors Macey and Miller found the double liability 
regime to be an effective counterweight to the moral hazard problem, 
they readily recognized the many shortcomings of the approach as 
well, including such drawbacks as determining the assessment amount, 
identifying the persons liable for assessment, limiting administrative 
discretion, enforcing the assessments in group settings and with for­
eign investors, and adjusting the assessment to take into account fun-
325. See id. 
326. See Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 35. 
327. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the 
Market for Bank Control, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1153, 1162-65 (1988) (discussing the perverse 
incentives created by deposit insurance that move bank managers toward increasingly risky ac­
tivities that result in a transfer of wealth from the nonshareholder claimants to the shareholders 
of the bank). 
328. Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 32. 
329. See id. at 33. 
330. See id. at 34. 
331. /d. at 35. 
332. See Lewis T. Evans & Neil C. Quigley, Shareholder Liability Regimes, Principal-Agent 
Relationships, and Banking Industry Performance, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 497, 502-03 (1995). 
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damental corporate changes.333 What they did not examine was the 
problem that the double liability approach continues to hold equity­
holders liable even when the bank fails for macroeconomic reasons 
unrelated to management misconduct. Nor does a double-liability re­
gime square very well with capital requirements as they are currently 
implemented. It would make little sense to spend a great deal of regu­
latory time and effort trying to determine the level of satisfactory cap­
italization only to then hold shareholders personally liable when the 
mandated amount of capital proves insufficient after all. Finally, the 
objections raised above334 regarding the market discipline hypothesis 
must be addressed in the context of double-liability schemes, espe­
cially the limits on the ability of the equity holders to monitor their 
managers effectively. 
The quasi-agency approach strikes a better balance than double 
liability because it is not limited to an artificial amount of extra liabil­
ity, such as the par value of the shares, when the actual damages ow­
ing to those harmed may far exceed that amount. At the same time, 
the amount owing under the quasi-agency approach could be much 
less than the artificial amount available under the double-liability 
scheme. The flexibility afforded by the quasi-agency approach to pro­
. vide recompense only for those who were harmed by the failure of the 
directors to discharge their duties is an important feature of the 
scheme. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
Banking regulation in the United States for many years has found 
various ways to impose liability on bank holding companies when 
bank subsidiaries fail. Unfortunately, public policy never offered a co­
herent and compelling justification for these enhanced obligations. 
Assuming there may be occasions when imposing liability on holding 
companies may be appropriate, the imposition of liability should only 
occur where the bank subsidiary's directors owed a duty to a non­
shareholder constituent (including the bank as a bank) and failed to 
discharge that duty properly. In those situations, the duties that the 
subsidiary directors should have carried out should be imposed di­
rectly on the holding company. The amount of damages owing should 
be limited to harms caused by failure to discharge the duties. 
This approach to bank holding company liability, which I call the 
quasi-agency approach, provides a better mechanism to strike a bal­
ance between bank liability and holding company liability than the 
competing approaches to this problem that have been offered in the 
past. The other approaches all miss the mark of striking the right bal­
ance because they are grounded in regulatory justifications that do not 
333. See Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 39-55 (discussing each of these shortcomings). 
334. See supra notes 91-115 and accompanying text. 
1014 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1999 
withstand close scrutiny. The quasi-agency approach corrects the 
shortcomings of the earlier proposals. 
As we enter the twenty-first century, we must take an important 
look at the crucial topic of holding company liability. If the United 
States expects its banks to effectively compete in the financial services 
marketplace of the future, regulators must rebalance the amount of 
liability imposed on bank holding companies for bank failure. If not, 
the cost of owning a U.S. bank will be relatively more expensive than 
owning other banks and banks in the United States could suffer a 
competitive disadvantage. 
 
